Can Agencies Lie? A Realist’s Guide to Pretext Review by Thorlin, Jack
Maryland Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 4 Article 3 
Can Agencies Lie? A Realist’s Guide to Pretext Review 
Jack Thorlin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jack Thorlin, Can Agencies Lie? A Realist’s Guide to Pretext Review, 80 Md. L. Rev. 1021 (2021) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM 








Can federal agencies lie about why they issue a rule—and should they 
be able to?  In the recent case of Department of Commerce v. New York, 
Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion for the Court upheld a district court 
ruling that the Department of Commerce’s use of a pretextual explanation 
for its proposed addition of a citizenship question to the 2020 Census violated 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).  The four liberal-leaning Justices 
joined the Chief Justice’s decision on pretext, but they also would have found 
the rulemaking arbitrary and capricious on other grounds.  The four 
conservative-leaning Justices dissented regarding pretext, stopping just 
short of saying that pretextual explanations are acceptable under the APA. 
The state of jurisprudence on pretext is now uncertain.  Department of 
Commerce left several questions unanswered, including precisely how courts 
are to determine whether an explanation is pretextual, how agencies might 
“fix” a rule remanded back to them on grounds of pretext, and whether the 
case’s unique factual circumstances render the doctrine largely inapplicable 
to other contexts.  The new doctrine presents an unpalatable choice for 
courts: require seemingly utopian candor from federal agencies tasked with 
implementing democratically-endorsed agendas, or permit evident 
falsehoods on the part of political agency heads.  From a policy perspective, 
there are compelling arguments on both sides of the proposition.  Allowing 
agencies to use pretextual explanations increases democratic control over 
the regulatory process by permitting increased political influence over the 
supposedly technocratic agencies.  However, prohibiting pretextual 
explanations could improve both the substance and transparency of 
rulemaking. 
This Article argues that pretext doctrine should be understood as a 
reaction to the abuse of expertise, as originally technocratic agencies have 
been increasingly employed to achieve properly legislative political ends.  
The legal process should proceed as follows: When plaintiffs make an initial 
showing that the agency may have acted in bad faith, a reviewing court 
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should authorize additional discovery, and overturn the agency action if the 
agency issued a pretextual explanation.  The agency then automatically loses 
the presumption of regularity and the court should impose a higher standard 
of review if the agency tries to reissue a substantively identical rule.  
Evidence of pretext can and should rebut the ordinary deference courts show 
toward agencies.  While care should be taken to craft a realistic pretext 
doctrine, the complexities of pretext review should not dissuade courts from 
trying to improve agency honesty.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The issue is simply stated: Can agencies lie about why they take actions?  
If so, in what ways can they lie?  Can they offer an explanation that was 
entirely irrelevant to the process?  What if the decisionmaker was aware of 
the proffered rationale, but it seems very unlikely that it influenced their 
decision?  The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) allows judicial review 
of agency actions to ensure a reasoned decision-making process, but it does 
not explicitly place the motive of anyone involved in the process at issue.1  
Although lower federal courts have obliquely addressed the issue, the 
Supreme Court recently plunged into the fray in Department of Commerce v. 
New York.2  The Court held that the Department of Commerce’s addition of 
a citizenship question to the 2020 Census was based on a pretextual rationale, 
and therefore the agency’s action violated the APA.3  
Before Department of Commerce, the answer to “can agencies lie?” was 
a tacit “yes.”  While that answer may offend the naive, there has been a clear 
jurisprudential and policy explanation for it.  Just as the law avoids inquiring 
too deeply into the mental state of jurors to preserve the democratic 
 
 1. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 2. 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (Dep’t of Com.). 
 3. Id. at 2575–76. 
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legitimacy of jury trials,4 allowing agencies to act pretextually preserves the 
President’s ability to effect policy change through agencies ostensibly 
premised on non-democratic expertise and avoids the need for messy and 
penetrating inquiries into the mental state of agency decisionmakers.5   
Judging by the outcome of Department of Commerce, the utilitarian 
calculus of agency mendacity appears to have shifted during the Trump 
administration.  Courts historically countenanced agencies acting politically 
if the agency could produce a somewhat plausible alternative explanation.6  
However, a broad perception of agency ineptitude combined with the 
specifically implausible agency explanation in Department of Commerce left 
the judiciary in an ugly situation.  If agencies can brazenly lie and courts are 
unwilling to acknowledge it, the public will rationally grow to distrust both 
federal agencies and the federal judiciary.  People might reasonably object 
that citizens who lie under oath are perjurers, but agencies lying about their 
actions face no consequences.  Open mendacity also presents a challenge to 
the constitutional balance of power because the agencies hold power granted 
by Congress based on their supposed expertise—if agencies lie about why 
they act, on what basis is the grant of power by Congress legitimate? 
In a parallel development, with Congress largely unable to pass major 
legislation, ideologically-driven change in the federal government frequently 
originates with executive branch agencies.  Upon taking office, presidents 
and their administrations already know what major regulatory actions they 
want to take; often, they have made specific campaign promises to take those 
actions.7  When it comes time to actually issue the rule, the agency must 
 
 4. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 115–16, 127 (1987) (declining to overturn 
a verdict returned by a jury whose members had consumed alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during 
the trial and deliberations).  
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 420–22 (1941) (Morgan IV) (holding that 
an agency decisionmaker in a quasi-judicial setting should not be subject to inquiries into mental 
processes under most circumstances). 
 6. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (upholding an 
agency rule because the agency offered an “alternative rationale based on the confluence of 
independently improbable assumptions” despite the agency’s analysis “bear[ing] every evidence of 
having been inserted as a make-weight by someone who had not the slightest idea what he was 
talking about”). 
 7. See, for example, the repeal of the Clean Power Plan under President Trump’s 
Environmental Protection Agency, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019).  As a candidate, Donald 
Trump said at a rally: “I will eliminate all needless and job-killing regulations now on the 
books. . . . [That] also means scrapping the EPA’s so-called Clean Power Plan which the 
government itself estimates will cost $7.2 billion a year.  This Obama-Clinton directive will shut 
down most, if not all, coal-powered electricity plans in America.  Remember what Hillary Clinton 
said?  She wants to shut down the miners, just like she wants to shut down the steel mills.”  Tessa 
Berenson, Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Jobs and the Economy, TIME (Sept. 15, 2016, 12:38 
PM EDT), http://time.com/4495507/donald-trump-economy-speech-transcript/ (providing a 
transcript of Trump’s remarks). 
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explain the reasons for its action.8  In many cases, the agency offers an 
explanation that differs from the rationale put forth by the President or his 
advisors in a campaign setting or in private discussions and correspondence.9  
However, the APA created a judicial review process that requires, among 
other things, that agencies engage in a reasoned decision-making process.10  
Some courts have interpreted the APA’s requirement as also requiring a 
disclosure of the actual reasons for the decision made.11  Other courts have 
been satisfied as long as there existed some sufficiently rational explanation, 
even if other unspoken reasons seemed more central.12 
The recent case Department of Commerce v. New York marked the 
Supreme Court’s first clear foray into the issue of pretext.  In a messy 5-4 
split, the Court upheld a district court decision that invalidated and remanded 
the Department of Commerce’s addition of a citizenship question to the 2020 
Census.13  Chief Justice John Roberts, joined in the controlling section by the 
Court’s four liberal Justices, declared that the Department had offered a 
pretextual justification that rendered the underlying action invalid under the 
APA.14  However, he stressed that courts should rarely allow discovery 
outside the administrative record to find the actual justification.15  By 
 
 8.  Department of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019) (“Our scope of review is 
‘narrow’: we determine only whether the Secretary examined ‘the relevant data’ and articulated ‘a 
satisfactory explanation’ for his decision, ‘including a rational connection between the facts found 
and the choice made.’”). 
 9. Compare the EPA’s stated rationale for repealing the Clean Power Plan, U.S. EPA, 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE REPEAL OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN, AND THE 
EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY 
GENERATING UNITS, at ES-2 (June 2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-
06/documents/utilities_ria_final_cpp_repeal_and_ace_2019-06.pdf (“[T]he EPA concludes that 
even if the CPP were implemented, it would not achieve emission reductions beyond those that 
would be achieved in a business-as-usual projection.”), with statements Donald Trump made during 
his campaign, Donald Trump, Donald Trump Campaign Rally in Hilton Head, South Carolina, C-
SPAN (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.c-span.org/video/?402610-1/donald-trump-campaign-rally-
hilton-head-south-carolina&start=2138&transcriptQuery=hoax (“Obama’s talking about all of this 
with the global warming and the—a lot of it’s a hoax, it’s a hoax. I mean, it’s a money-making 
industry, OK? It’s a hoax, a lot of it.”) (emphasis omitted).   
 10. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983) 
(“[T]he agency must explain the evidence which is available, and must offer a rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). 
 11. See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
(“[T]he evidence is clear that Secretary Ross’s rationale was pretextual — that is, that the real reason 
for his decision was something other than the sole reason he put forward in his Memorandum . . . .”). 
 12. See Jagers v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 758 F.3d 1179, 1185–86 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that 
a subjective desire on the part of an agency for a particular outcome would not invalidate a 
rulemaking that had an objective explanation). 
 13. Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019).  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 2574–75. 
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remanding, he also offered the Department an opportunity to present 
evidence of an alternative motive.16  The four liberal Justices, unified in one 
opinion written by Justice Stephen Breyer, joined the pretext section to make 
it control the outcome of the case.  But they focused much of their attention 
on arguing that the Department’s decision was arbitrary and capricious on 
other grounds, regardless of whether it was pretextual.17  
The conservative Justices openly disagreed with the Chief Justice on the 
facts of the case, but seemed to tacitly agree on doctrine, largely contenting 
themselves with dramatic declarations about how unprecedented a review for 
pretext would be.18  Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for himself, Justice 
Neil Gorsuch, and Justice Brett Kavanaugh, opined that federal agencies are 
owed a “presumption of regularity” that normally precludes inquiry into 
whether their explanation is pretextual.19  The conservative Justices’ opinion 
consistently hedges, never quite ruling out the possibility of overruling a 
pretextual decision when it would be appropriate to overturn.20  Justice Alito 
wrote separately, arguing that the APA did not apply to the question at hand 
at all.  In dicta, however, he strongly condemned the idea of considering 
whether an agency rationale is pretextual.21  He colorfully opined, “[w]hat 
Bismarck is reputed to have said about laws and sausages comes to mind.”22 
The Supreme Court’s disagreement over whether agencies can act based 
on pretext digs up fundamental debates about the role of executive branch 
agencies.  Are they technocratic instruments designed to enforce Congress’s 
will in areas where Congress lacks technical knowledge or capacity?23  Or 
are agencies an extension of the president’s will—a sort of exoskeleton that 
can bring campaign promises to fruition?24  Is it pointless to try to stamp out 
pretext when agencies literally do not have a singular intent and can 
practically never be wholly truthful about their reasons for acting? 
I will argue that while there are serious philosophical questions to raise 
about pretext review, they are surmountable, and the doctrine itself is a 
 
 16. Id. at 2576. 
 17. Id. at 2584 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 18. See, e.g., id. at 2576, 2579 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The 
Court’s holding reflects an unprecedented departure from our deferential review of discretionary 
agency decisions. . . . Unsurprisingly, then, this Court has never held an agency decision arbitrary 
and capricious on the ground that its supporting rationale was ‘pretextual.’”). 
 19. Id. at 2578. 
 20.  See, e.g., id. at 2596 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 21.  Id. at 2597–98 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 22. Id. at 2597 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 23. This is the general theory behind the “intelligible principle” of the nondelegation doctrine, 
discussed at length most recently in Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
 24. This is the general theory behind the “unitary executive” principle most clearly outlined in 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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necessary corrective to the trend of agency politicization.  With eyes open to 
the practical difficulties of pretext review, courts can and should develop a 
detailed doctrine to promote truthful explanations from agencies.  Part I of 
this Article reviews the history of how federal courts have dealt with the 
issue, including recent Supreme Court decisions relating to Trump 
administration policies.25  Part II discusses the theoretical and practical 
difficulties of judicial review of pretextual decision-making.26  Part III 
addresses criticisms of pretext review and suggests ways in which the 
doctrine could evolve to rebut those criticisms.27 
I. THE JUDICIARY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH PRETEXT 
The state of jurisprudence on agency pretext was foggy before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Commerce.28  Agencies could 
not openly lie, it seems, but they could avoid most judicial oversight 
regarding pretext without much effort.29  The messy split decision in 
Department of Commerce renders the precise state of pretext law unclear, but 
with a careful reading, we can discern the new rule of pretext.  The Roberts 
pretext doctrine did not overturn precedent, but it essentially invented a new 
APA requirement largely divorced from the text of the APA itself.  In so 
doing, it is unclear how much pretext doctrine will actually change agency 
behavior.  In their opinions, the conservative Justices seem to fear that pretext 
review is a powder keg sitting beneath the walls of administrative law,30 but 
the specific circumstances of Department of Commerce led skeptics to 
believe Chief Justice Roberts created pretext doctrine to solve one thorny 
case where the Trump administration was caught acting in an underhanded 
way.31  Subsequent case law will determine whether this interpretation is 
correct, or if pretext doctrine charts a more moderate course. 
 
 25. See infra Part I. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. See, e.g., Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 547 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that FDA 
actions relating to emergency contraceptives were arbitrary and capricious because they were “not 
the result of reasoned and good faith agency decision-making”, but not clarifying whether the 
agency’s use of a pretextual justification was per se arbitrary and capricious).  
 29. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, supra note 6 (upholding agency action that the court 
itself mocked for being uninformed). 
 30. See Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2583-84 (2019) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s decision enables partisans to use the courts to harangue 
executive officers through depositions, discovery, delay, and distraction” and “could even implicate 
separation-of-powers concerns insofar as it enables judicial interference with the enforcement of 
laws.”) 
 31. See Nicholas Bronni, Census Symposium: Unusual Facts Make for Unusual Decisions, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/census-symposium-unusual-
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A. Pretext’s Prologue: The Judiciary’s Relationship with Agency 
Truthfulness 
The pre-Department of Commerce jurisprudence relating to pretext 
dealt less with the genuineness of agency explanations than the circumstances 
in which courts should review evidence outside the administrative record.32  
These cases did not answer the question of whether agencies could give 
pretextual explanations, but tended to imply answers.  One cannot avoid the 
impression that courts found it simply unseemly to question whether an 
agency decisionmaker had lied in offering an explanation for the agency’s 
action.33  Instead of directly questioning agency truthfulness, courts allowed 
an additional inquiry under some circumstances into whether the agency had 
included all evidence under consideration in the administrative record.34  The 
leading Supreme Court case pushing lower courts to probe further into 
agency decision-making processes, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. 
v. Volpe,35 did not by any means prohibit pretextual decision-making; it 
merely held that, absent agency explanation, courts could inquire into the 
agency’s actual rationale.36  However, while the pre-Department of 
Commerce cases do not lend obvious support for inquiries into the 
truthfulness of a proffered agency explanation, they keep the door open to 
such an inquiry just enough to allow an eventual decision like Department of 
Commerce.37  
B. Early Cases: The Morgan Doctrine Suggests Pretext is Irrelevant 
Regulation has always engendered political opposition, but courts did 
not meaningfully address issues relating to the truthfulness of agency 
rationales until the middle of the twentieth century.  Administrative law 
evolved under political pressure stemming from philosophical attacks on 
 
facts-make-for-unusual-decisions/ (arguing that Department of Commerce will likely have little 
precedential effect because of the unique circumstances of the case). 
 32. See Travis O. Brandon, Reforming the Extra-Record Evidence Rule in Arbitrary and 
Capricious Review of Informal Agency Actions: A New Procedural Approach, 21 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 981, 991–94 (2017). 
 33. See, e.g., Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 421 (“[B]oth [judges and Cabinet officers charged by 
Congress with adjudicatory functions] are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual 
discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 35. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 36. Id. at 420. 
 37. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971), abrogated 
by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) (holding that, in the absence of formal agency findings, 
a court could order a review of the actual administrative record considered by the agency head when 
he made his decision in order to determine whether his actions violated the APA). 
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regulation and more nuanced demands for adequate process.38  Early cases 
applied specific statutory requirements for particular kinds of rules, but 
generally did not look deeply into the motivations of agency decisionmakers.  
If a specific statute said that an agency had to consider a certain kind of 
evidence, and plaintiffs could show the agency had not made such a 
consideration, then the courts would intervene.39  Courts generally left open 
the question of whether motivations mattered.40 
From the emergence of a major regulatory state in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries up to the adoption of the APA in 1946, judicial 
oversight of agency rulemaking largely related to substance.  An anti-
regulation judiciary fought administrative power on philosophical and 
constitutional grounds.  Various constitutional provisions and doctrines 
provided the main check on abusive agency rulemaking, most notably the 
nondelegation doctrine in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan.41  In Panama 
Refining, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not give the President 
legislative powers without clear guidance on how to use them.42  Eventually, 
the constitutional attacks on regulation provoked political counterattacks 
against the Supreme Court by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, leading 
to the Supreme Court stepping down from its substantive attack on the power 
to regulate in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.43  Once President Roosevelt 
successfully pressured the Supreme Court to abandon constitutional 
doctrines against administrative rulemaking, resistance to regulatory 
expansion shifted to procedural grounds.44  
Against a complicated factual background, the 1941 case United States 
v. Morgan45 addressed the issue of pretext, though it framed the issue in terms 
of bias.46  The Secretary of Agriculture had, pursuant to statute, set a 
maximum rate for services rendered by private agencies doing business at the 
 
 38. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (invalidating a regulation on baker’s 
hours on grounds that it violated a common law right to freedom of contract protected in the due 
process clause); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 22 (1938) (Morgan II) (holding that a hearing 
held by the Secretary of Agriculture was procedurally defective).  
 39. See Morgan II, 304 U.S. at 22 (holding that a hearing held by the Secretary of Agriculture 
was procedurally defective). 
 40. See, e.g., Morgan IV, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (holding that there is a presumption of validity 
in the motive for an agency decision which can only be overcome by exceptional evidence). 
 41. 293 U.S. 388, 428 (1935). 
 42. Id.  
 43. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 44. John Q. Barrett, Attribution Time: Cal Tinney’s 1937 Quip, “A Switch in Time’ll Save 
Nine”, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 229 (2021). 
 45. Morgan IV, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).  
 46. Id. at 420–22. 
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Kansas City Stockyards.47  The statute required the Secretary to provide a 
hearing for the agencies, and the Supreme Court had held in two previous 
cases that the Secretary: (a) had to hold a hearing; and (b) could not satisfy 
the procedural requirements by simply reading the agencies’ testimonies.48  
In a third case, the Court held that the Secretary did not have to return excess 
payments made by the agencies until the Department of Agriculture held a 
new hearing to determine what the reasonable payment rate should have 
been.49  The fourth case, the most relevant to the present discussion, came 
after the hearing that was the subject of the third case.50  There, the Secretary 
sent a letter to the New York Times criticizing the Court’s ruling in the second 
case, as well as the idea of returning money to the agencies.51  The agencies 
argued that the letter showed the Secretary’s bias because he wrote it before 
deciding the retroactive rates that would determine the agency’s repayment 
obligations.52  The Secretary formally denied harboring any bias.53 
The Supreme Court held that the Secretary did not have to deny his bias 
because Congress had entrusted him to act as a judge.54  According to the 
Court: 
Cabinet officers charged by Congress with adjudicatory functions 
are not assumed to be flabby creatures any more than judges are.  
Both may have an underlying philosophy in approaching a specific 
case.  But both are assumed to be men of conscience and 
intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy 
fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.  Nothing in this record 
disturbs such an assumption.55 
This case’s assumption that agency decisionmakers, like judges, should 
not have their inner mental processes probed developed into a subset of the 
deliberative process privilege.56  While we all may suspect that judges, like 
everyone else, can harbor bias, the Morgan doctrine argues that public trust 
in the legal system requires a presumption that judges will act impartially.57 
 
 47. Id. at 413.  
 48. Morgan v. United States (Morgan I), 298 U.S. 468, 477–79 (1936); Morgan II, 304 U.S. 1, 
13–14 (1938). 
 49. United States v. Morgan (Morgan III), 307 U.S. 183, 197–98 (1939). 
 50. Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 414. 
 51. Id. at 420. 
 52. Id. at 420. 
 53. Id. at 421. 
 54. Id. at 422. 
 55. Id. at 421. 
 56. See generally Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 
54 MO. L. REV. 279 (1989).  
 57. See McKay Coppins, Is Brett Kavanaugh Out for Revenge?, ATLANTIC (May 13, 2021), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/06/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court/618717/ 
  
2021] CAN AGENCIES LIE? 1031 
 
As developed through federal common law, the Morgan doctrine, stated 
succinctly, is: “current high-ranking government officials should not be 
subject to the taking of depositions absent extraordinary circumstances.”58  
Most courts justified the doctrine as a way to avoid wasting the time of 
agency decisionmakers.59  However, if there is a “showing of grounds to 
suspect bad faith or improper behavior not apparent from the administrative 
record,” then such a deposition could be warranted.60  Weighing the strength 
of evidence showing bad faith against concern for the time of agency 
decisionmakers suggests that the more senior the decisionmaker, the stronger 
the showing of bad faith or improper behavior must be in order to justify 
deposition.61 
What sort of “bad faith or improper behavior” could justify deposing a 
high-ranking government official and, more specifically, examining his or 
her mental processes?  Few cases address the issue at all, much less discuss 
it at length.  One successful showing led a court to order deposition of the 
Comptroller of the Currency on the allegation that he had issued a branch 
certificate to a particular bank because of a “personal relationship.”62  
Another successful case involved a prima facie showing that a specific law 
had been violated by the official claiming protection under Morgan.63 
The Morgan doctrine can be read to either support or denigrate the idea 
of investigating pretext.  On one hand, the doctrine creates a strong 
presumption against obtaining evidence about agency decisionmakers’ 
mental processes.  If one cannot obtain evidence about those processes, it is 
difficult to prove that the actual rationale differs from the agency’s stated 
rationale.  On the other hand, what is pretext if not a form of “bad faith”?  If 
a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the agency is lying about the 
reason the decisionmaker made his decision, would that not be the sort of bad 
faith that would enable deeper investigation into the mental process?  
There is an unspoken assumption here that if bad faith is shown and 
subsequent investigation finds strong bias, then that would provide grounds 
for invalidating the agency action in question.  However, it is not clear from 
the terms of Morgan what the grounds for invalidating the action would have 
been.  The specific statute in question in Morgan did not require an absence 
 
(explaining that the Court itself is “invested in maintaining the perception that [its] work is done 
beyond the reach of rank politics”). 
 58. United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d 309, 316 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 59. Church of Scientology of Bos. v. I.R.S., 138 F.R.D. 9, 12 (D. Mass. 1990). 
 60. Cmty. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 96 F.R.D. 619, 621 (D.D.C. 
1983).  
 61. Id.  
 62. Union Sav. Bank of Patchogue, N.Y. v. Saxon, 209 F. Supp. 319, 319–320 (D.D.C. 1962). 
 63. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 1964). 
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of bias.  The Supreme Court later found that constitutional due process 
requires some level of impartiality, but that is a far cry from forbidding 
pretextual decision-making.64  It is also noteworthy that Morgan involved a 
quasi-judicial agency activity, not a run-of-the-mill policy decision.65  At the 
time of Morgan, courts were still a long way off from requiring impartiality 
as to policy, even if Morgan implied impartiality might be required in a 
tribunal-like setting. 
C. The Administrative Procedure Act’s Silence on Pretext 
As courts moved away from constitutional arguments to curtail 
regulations, Congress increasingly took a more active role.  If courts would 
not prevent overregulation on constitutional grounds, Congress could at least 
moderate executive power through process requirements.66  Consequently, 
lawmakers in Congress wary of overregulation began pressing for set 
processes that would restrain the executive branch.67  Five years after 
Morgan, Congress’s work culminated in the passage of the APA in 1946.68 
The APA statute does not discuss pretext in its text, but one can see hints 
at the concept.  The relevant portion of the APA sounds simple on its face: a 
court reviewing an agency action shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”69  The 
legislative history from 1946 reveals very little discussion of the precise 
meaning of “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion,” let alone 
contemplation over whether it would include pretext.70  In the House report 
accompanying passage of the APA, the Judiciary Committee stated: “It 
will . . . be the duty of reviewing courts to prevent avoidance of the 
requirements of the bill by any manner or form of indirection, and to 
determine the meaning of the words and phrases used.”71  Here, the Judiciary 
 
 64. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). 
 65. Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 422. 
 66. See Roni Elias, The Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, 27 FORDHAM 
ENV’T L. REV. 207, 209–11 (2016).  
 67. Id. 
 68. Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
 69. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018). 
 70. Id.; see generally, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1980 (1946) (House report contains no discussion of 
specific meaning of arbitrary and capricious); Administrative Procedure: Hearings Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong. (1945) (House Judiciary Committee hearings on the 
Administrative Procedure Act contain no discussion of the meaning of arbitrary and capricious); 
Administrative Procedure Act: Proceedings in the H.R. & the S., 79th Cong. (1946) (House and 
Senate committee hearings on the APA contain no discussion of the meaning of arbitrary and 
capricious). 
 71. H.R. REP. NO. 1980, at 278. 
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Committee left open the possibility of “arbitrary” or “capricious” 
encompassing pretext as a form of “indirection.”72    
It should not be at all surprising that “arbitrary” and “capricious” 
encapsulate many different concepts.  One meaning of “arbitrary” is “existing 
or coming about seemingly at random or by chance or as a capricious and 
unreasonable act of will.”73  Another is “marked by or resulting from the 
unrestrained and often tyrannical exercise of power.”74  Yet another is “based 
on or determined by individual preference or convenience rather than by 
necessity or the intrinsic nature of something.”75  There are three inconsistent 
ideas to define what “arbitrary” could mean: (1) random; (2) unreasonable; 
or (3) unilateral to the point of tyranny.  “[C]apricious” also fails to help.  The 
primary definition is “governed or characterized by caprice,”76 which in turn 
is defined as “a sudden, impulsive, and seemingly unmotivated notion or 
action” or “a sudden usually unpredictable condition, change, or series of 
changes.”77  From those definitions, I take two shades of meaning relevant 
for a discussion of pretext: (1) a lack of clear reason; and (2) unpredictability.  
The very definition of “pretext” includes the concept that it is used “to cloak 
the real intention or state of affairs”.78 Offering a false explanation inherently 
makes the true explanation less clear.  
Despite these arguments for connecting pretext review to arbitrary and 
capricious review, some courts that have held that the APA prohibits 
pretextual decision-making do not consistently point to any particular 
provision of the APA prohibiting pretext when they overturn agency 
actions.79  But others have specified that pretext violates the prohibition 
against arbitrary and capricious actions.80  A reasonable reader, coming to the 
APA for the first time, might think that a decision made on pretextual grounds 
is arbitrary.  A simple analogy illuminates that interpretation—police 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Arbitrary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/arbitrary 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Capricious, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/capricious (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
 77. Caprice, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/caprice (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
 78. Pretext, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/caprice (last 
visited May 19, 2021). 
 79. See, e.g., N.Y. v. Dep’t of Com., New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 
660, 647, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (discussing arbitrary and capricious review separately from pretext 
review). 
 80. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, No. CV 07-0038-PHX-MHM, 2008 
WL 659822, at *11 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2008). 
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enforcement of speed limits.  Virtually no one rigorously adheres to speed 
limits, so when police do strictly enforce the limits, it certainly seems 
pretextual.  Indeed, Martin Luther King Jr. was once arrested for driving 30 
miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone.81  Given the historical context, we 
can be certain this was a pretextual arrest illustrating “arbitrary” power to 
punish whoever was disfavored by the police.  The Supreme Court has not 
embraced that interpretation, however, and so pretext’s connection to the 
APA remains undefined. 
D. Overton Park and Its Progeny 
Before Department of Commerce, the Supreme Court case that most 
directly dealt with pretext was Overton Park.  It is consistently cited for the 
proposition that there can be an inquiry into the mental processes of agency 
decisionmakers upon a “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.”82  
The ruling sticks out like a sore thumb in the administrative law canon against 
intruding into agency decision-making processes—so much so that Justice 
Thomas’s partial concurrence in Department of Commerce hinted at his 
desire to overturn Overton Park.83  While subsequent cases at lower levels 
narrowed Overton Park or stressed its limitations, it remained available as 
precedent for Department of Commerce nearly a half century later.84 
While the facts of Overton Park make the case seem straightforward, 
under the surface, they present questions of agency motivation that dominate 
the discussion of pretext.  The bare facts are as follows: The Secretary of 
Transportation decided that there was no feasible alternative to building a 
highway through Overton Park in Memphis, Tennessee.85  There were no 
formal findings to support his decision; nothing by which a court could judge 
 
 81. King Arrested for Speeding; MIA Holds Seven Mass Meetings, STAN. UNIV.: MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR. RSCH. & EDUC. INST. (Jan. 26, 1956), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/ 
encyclopedia/king-arrested-speeding-mia-holds-seven-mass-meetings. 
 82. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).  See, e.g., Kirsch 
v. Dep’t of Consumer and Bus. Servs., 278 P.3d 104, 111 (2012). 
 83. Justice Thomas said in a footnote: “Insofar as Overton Park authorizes an exception to 
review on the administrative record, it has been criticized as having ‘no textual grounding in the 
APA’ and as ‘created by the Court, without citation or explanation, to facilitate Article III 
review.’ . . . The legitimacy and scope of the exception . . . is an important question that may 
warrant future consideration.”  Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2579 n.5 (2019) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted). 
 84. See, e.g., Kunaknana v. Clark, 742 F.2d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 1984) (distinguishing the facts 
of the case from Overton Park’s general rule against post hoc rationalizations); Voyageurs Nat. Park 
Ass’n v. Norton, 381 F.3d 759, 766 (8th Cir. 2004) (stressing that extra-record evidence should not 
be allowed unless it is “the only way there can be effective judicial review). 
 85. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 406–08 (1971), abrogated by 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
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whether the action was arbitrary or capricious.86  The Department supplied 
affidavits after the fact stating a justification.87  The Court held that the 
Department had to produce a record justifying its decision and, if it did not, 
litigants could depose the Secretary to establish what the actual decision-
making process was.88  Beneath the surface, state, local, and federal officials 
were trying to address a variety of political issues, including sociological 
factors surrounding the dislocation of people around the park.89  Those 
sensitive factors most likely played a role in the Department’s lack of an 
administrative record—those various considerations would (a) look bad if 
discussed on the record; and (b) force the federal government to weigh in on 
sensitive questions it would rather leave up to local and state officials.90 
Overton Park was, to put it bluntly, a strange case, and its resolution 
raised more questions than answers regarding agency pretext.  The Court 
ultimately remanded the case to the district court to decide whether a 
deposition was necessary.91  The controlling opinion explicitly stated that 
post hoc rationalizations had “traditionally been found to be an inadequate 
basis for review.”92  However, a mere three paragraphs later, the Court 
clarified: “It may be that the Secretary can prepare formal findings including 
the information required by DOT Order 5610.1 that will provide an adequate 
explanation for his action.  Such an explanation will, to some extent, be a 
‘post hoc rationalization’ and thus must be viewed critically.”93  One can 
reasonably infer from the second statement that a pretextual explanation 
could be acceptable, though it must be “viewed critically.”94  A frustrated 
reader in 2019 can be forgiven for wondering what “viewed critically” means 
in the context of post hoc rationalizations.  Does the rationalization simply 
have to be extra compelling?  By the very nature of a post hoc rationalization, 
it cannot be a genuine description of the thought process that went into the 
decision itself, so presumably there is no heightened standard for truthfulness 
of the post hoc rationalization as compared to something in the administrative 
record. 
 
 86. Id. at 408. 
 87. Id. at 409. 
 88. Id. at 420. 
 89. See Peter L. Strauss, Administrative Law Stories: Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. 
Volpe 4, 30 (Columbia Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group Paper No. 
05-85; Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 267, 2004), https://scholarship.law.columbia. 
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2350&context=faculty_scholarship. 
 90. Id. at 28. 
 91. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420–21.  
 92. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419. 
 93. Id. at 420. 
 94. Id. 
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Lower courts frequently cite Overton Park, but generally have not 
expanded on its seeming disregard for pretextual explanations.95  When 
upholding the action, courts cited Overton Park for the proposition that courts 
owe agencies a “presumption of regularity,” a phrase that Justice Thomas’s 
opinion would use in his Department of Commerce dissent.96  Courts finding 
that agencies acted arbitrarily or capriciously tended to cite Overton Park for 
the proposition that courts could order augmentation of the administrative 
record, even absent evidence of bad faith on the part of the agency.97  Some 
lower courts found opportunities to narrow Overton Park, some going so far 
as to implicitly approve of pretext.98  The most explicit of these, South 
Terminal Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency,99 a First Circuit case 
from 1974, held that “[p]ossibly barring fraud and other extreme 
circumstances, the mental process by which the Administrator [of the EPA] 
reached his decision, if it is explained by the record, is not a proper subject 
for discovery.”100  So long as an agency produced a rationale, a court would 
not examine the decisionmaker’s mental processes—in other words, pretext 
was acceptable.  The D.C. Circuit endorsed that narrow reading of Overton 
Park in 1979.101 
It is worth briefly noting that when courts describe pretext review as 
examining an agency decisionmaker’s “mental processes”, they are 
dramatically overstating the level of intrusion needed to evaluate whether a 
decision was pretextual.  This framing makes it seem as if a court must know 
the inside of the decisionmaker’s mind, a seemingly futile undertaking.  Of 
course, one can actually detect pretext much more easily by looking at 
external indicia that a decision has already been made, or that the agency’s 
stated justification was not its truthful rationale.  For example, if documents 
emerge revealing that the decisionmaker directed subordinates to find a 
legally acceptable explanation, one need not be a psychologist to understand 
that the decisionmaker is seeking a pretext.  Presumably, judges choose to 
 
 95. See, e.g., City of Coll. Station v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 395 F. Supp. 2d 495, 500 (S.D. Tex. 
2005) (citing Overton Park for the proposition that courts should not accept post hoc rationalizations 
and should avoid evaluating the mental processes of decisionmakers). 
 96. See, e.g., Movement Against Destruction v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 533, 546–47 (D. Md. 
1975) (explaining that agency actors’ actions “are entitled to a presumption of regularity”). 
 97. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Zinke, No. 17-CV-07187-WHO, 2018 WL 3126401, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. June 26, 2018). 
 98. See, e.g., South Terminal Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 504 F.2d 646, 675 
(1st Cir. 1974).  
 99. 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974). 
 100. Id. at 675. 
 101. National Courier Ass’n v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 516 F.2d 
1229, 2142 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“Unless he has left no other record of the reasons for his decision, the 
mental processes of an administrator may not be probed.”) 
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use the phrase “mental processes” as a rhetorical choice to underscore how 
difficult they would find something like pretext review to be. 
A few lower courts took Overton Park as a signal to go much further in 
probing agency decisionmaking processes.  The clearest example here is the 
D.C. Circuit in 1971, in another case involving then-Secretary of 
Transportation Volpe.  In D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe,102 
an influential member of the House of Representatives threatened to withhold 
funding for the District of Columbia rapid transit system unless Secretary 
Volpe approved a bridge construction project.103  The Secretary approved the 
bridge, and several citizens associations and individual property owners in 
the District of Columbia sued, claiming that Secretary Volpe violated the 
APA by acting on political grounds rather than reasoned decision-making.104  
Secretary Volpe testified that his decision was not based solely on political 
pressures.105  The D.C. Circuit nevertheless held that Secretary Volpe’s 
decision was arbitrary and capricious because political reasoning “usurp[ed]” 
the legitimate considerations the statute required the Secretary to consider.106  
This represents one of the most extreme versions of pretext doctrine, whereby 
“the Secretary must reach his decision strictly on the merits and in the manner 
prescribed by statute, without reference to irrelevant or extraneous 
considerations.”107  That phrasing seems to indicate that the existence of a 
political motive violates the APA even if the agency had and offered a 
legitimate explanation.  However, the facts of the case were that the 
Department had not made formal findings or a credible administrative 
record.108  It is thus more accurate to describe the holding as forbidding 
political considerations from taking the place of a technocratic rationale 
based on statutorily mandated factors, even if the court’s dicta went further. 
E. Between Overton Park and Department of Commerce 
Between Overton Park and Department of Commerce, district and 
circuit courts occasionally heard cases presenting issues that came very close 
to questions of pretext in the context of the APA.  In particular, the Tenth 
Circuit case Woods Petroleum Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior109 squarely held 
 
 102. 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 103. Id. at 1236. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1246. 
 106. Id. at 1246, 1248. 
 107. Id. at 1248. 
 108. Id. at 1237–38. 
 109. 18 F.3d 854 (10th Cir. 1994), adhered to on reh’g sub nom. Woods Petroleum Corp. v. 
Dep’t of Interior, 47 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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that when a pretextual rationale was the “sole reason” for an agency action, 
it was “arbitrary and capricious conduct” and violated the APA.110  On its 
face, the case directly answers the pretext question, but the details muddy the 
waters somewhat.  Without diving too deeply into the facts of the case, it is 
worth noting that the Bureau of Indian Affairs issued guidelines dictating 
specific factors the Secretary of the Interior should consider before taking the 
action he did.111  Because the Secretary did not consider those factors, the 
court, following earlier precedent, stated that the “presumption 
of . . . regularity“ did not apply.112  There is thus a case to be made that Woods 
Petroleum was not addressing a generic agency pretextual rationale, but a 
situation where the court was already according heightened scrutiny to the 
agency action.113  That distinction may explain why the cases and briefs citing 
Woods Petroleum are generally limited to either specific law relating to cases 
involving federal land leases or Trump-era cases desperately searching for a 
semblance of precedent to cling to.114 
Though few cases directly addressed whether an agency could use a 
pretextual explanation, some cases seemed to hint at the logic Justice Roberts 
would later employ in Department of Commerce.  The most compelling of 
these is the 2008 Arizona district court case Center for Biological Diversity 
v. Kempthorne.115  In that case, plaintiffs sued the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (“FWS”) over its decision not to define the bald eagle population of 
the Sonoran Desert as a distinct population segment warranting protection 
under the Endangered Species Act.116  The plaintiffs obtained emails in which 
FWS scientists said that their political superiors had “reached [a] policy call 
& we need to support [it],” and that their “[a]nswer has to be that its [sic] not 
a [distinct population segment] . . . [w]e have marching orders.”117  If that 
were not a clear enough indication of pretext, another email simply stated, 
“[w]e’ve been given an answer now we need to find an analysis that 
works . . . . Need to fit argument in as defensible a fashion as we can.”118  
Unfortunately for the development of pretext doctrine, the plaintiffs did their 
job a little too well, and the court decided that there was “no information in 
 
 110. Id. at 859–60. 
 111. Id. at 858. 
 112. Id. at 859. 
 113. Id. 
 114. As of May 6, 2021, Westlaw lists five cases citing to Woods Petroleum.  Two are Trump-
era, two relate to land disputes with the Interior Department, and one is the Supreme Court’s ruling 
denying certiorari in the Woods Petroleum litigation. 
 115. No. CV 07-0038-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 659822 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2008). 
 116. Id. at *1. 
 117. Id. at *11 (alterations in original). 
 118. Id. (alterations in original). 
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the FWS’s files to refute” their arguments.119  The court concluded that it 
could have “no confidence in the objectivity of the agency’s decision-making 
process,” but did not clearly specify whether the pretextual nature of the 
agency’s rationale or the lack of an adequate explanation was the basis for 
that judgment.120  The outcome of the case suggested a path for pretext 
review: If the agency’s process is clearly aimed at generating a pretext, then 
it is inherently suspect and therefore arbitrary.  However, the absence of 
viable evidence supporting the Agency’s decision meant that the rule was 
arbitrary and capricious regardless of whether the process was pretextual, 
robbing this case of its potential doctrinal importance.  
Other cases did not explicitly address pretext, but did restrict the role of 
politics in the agency decision-making process.  In Tummino v. Torti,121 for 
example, the Eastern District of New York remanded a rule back to the FDA 
after plaintiffs showed that the Agency had issued the rule to secure the 
Senate’s confirmation of a nominee to become the Commissioner of the 
FDA.122  The court held that political pressure “was intended to and did cause 
the agency’s action to be influenced by factors not relevant under the 
controlling statute.”123  That pressure meant that the FDA’s decision “[w]as 
[n]ot the [r]esult of [g]ood [f]aith and [r]easoned [a]gency [d]ecision-
[m]aking.”124  This decision is of limited utility because not every APA 
decision has statutorily mandated factors to consider, but the case’s 
underlying reasoning is still important.  When political impetus reaches a 
certain level, it causes the agency process to become inherently arbitrary and 
capricious.  Pretext is then merely a symptom of an arbitrary and capricious 
process, and one would ordinarily expect that the reason for pretext is that 
the true underlying rationale is political.  
Courts have also haltingly come to understand that deference to 
agencies can be conditional on the agencies acting in an aboveboard 
manner.125  The most succinct summary of this point can be found in an 
unpublished 1999 district court opinion:  
If courts are to defer to agency expertise as instructed by Marsh 
then they must have confidence in the objectivity of the agency’s 
decision making process.  On the other hand, if the objectivity of 
 
 119. Id. at *12. 
 120. Id.  
 121. 603 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), amended sub nom. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 05-
CV-366 ERK VVP, 2013 WL 865851 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013). 
 122. Id. at 546. 
 123. Id. at 544. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See, e.g., Am. Wildlands & Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., CV 97-160-
M-DWM, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22243, at *9–10 (D. Mont. Apr. 14, 1999). 
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agency decision making is questionable then the rationale for 
deference to the agency is undermined and courts must then bring 
a more rigorous standard of review to bear.  Otherwise there would 
be no check on the ability of an agency to circumvent 
environmental laws by simply “going-through-the-motions[.]”126 
This point has no grounding in existing jurisprudence, but the concept 
of conditional deference to agency expertise arguably lies at the heart of 
pretext review.127  There is little reason to defer to agency expertise if factors 
unrelated to expertise dominated the decision-making process. 
F. Department of Commerce v. New York: Dawn of Pretext Review 
Department of Commerce created, for the first time, a rule of pretext.128  
However, the factual predicate of the case and the political furor surrounding 
it was uniquely suited to a finding of pretext.129  It is not yet clear if the 
specific set of facts created a rule ultimately applicable in only this case, or 
if pretext review will become an important new doctrine.  The case revolved 
around Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross’s decision to add a question 
about citizenship to the 2020 Census.130  Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and 
the extreme facts found by the Southern District of New York at the trial 
court level make this case more the skeleton of a rule of pretext than a full-
fledged doctrine.131  Later sections of this Article will examine how the rule 
should be fleshed out.  For now, Department of Commerce shows that while 
tough cases can make bad law, easy cases can make uncertain law. 
1. The Roberts Rule of Pretext 
To understand Roberts’s rule, it is worth briefly examining the district 
court’s ruling, which Roberts decidedly did not adopt.  The district court’s 
doctrinal rationale was simple: It ruled that Secretary Ross’s decision was 
pretextual because “the rationale he provided for his decision was not his real 
rationale.”132  Judge Furman, the U.S. District Judge who presided over the 
case, asserted repeatedly that the Department had a duty to offer its actual 
 
 126. Am. Wildlands & Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., CV 97-160-M-DWM, 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22243, at *9–10 (D. Mont. Apr. 14, 1999). 
 127. See id. 
 128. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2574 (2019). 
 129. See Sarah Paoletti, The Supreme Court Holds the Line on Truth over Pretext, REGUL. REV. 
(July 15, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/15/paoletti-supreme-court-holds-line-truth-
pretext/ (describing the high political stakes of the decennial Census). 
 130. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551 (2019). 
 131. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 530–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 132. Id. at 635. 
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rationale.133  It is clear from reading the district court opinion that Judge 
Furman felt agencies must disclose the actual reason for their decision, not 
simply a rational basis that did not reflect the true decision-making process.134  
Judge Furman clarified that “a court cannot sustain agency action founded on 
a pretextual or sham justification that conceals the true ‘basis’ for the 
decision.”135  Adopting the district court’s rule would have required a 
substantial revision to the existing APA judicial review process.  Recall that 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that courts should not overturn agency 
action simply because the agency did not disclose all of its reasons for 
acting.136  Requiring agencies to actually issue the truthful reason would 
upend decades of caselaw.137 
The Roberts opinion is best understood as stepping back from the major 
changes the district court’s rule would have wrought.  Roberts, writing for 
himself and the four liberal justices who joined the pretext section of his 
analysis, found a way to rule that the sort of pretext involved in this case 
violated the APA, but established a doctrine vague enough that it could apply 
to almost no cases or almost all cases.138  The opinion does not outline a clear 
rule, but one can be discerned from the Chief Justice’s recitation of “settled” 
propositions.139  The Roberts rule on pretext consists of a number of simple 
statements which appear facially contradictory, but which can be reconciled 
if considered with sufficient nuance.  These statements are: 
 
(1)  Courts may not reject an agency’s stated rationale as arbitrary 




 133. See, e.g., id. (“Similarly, if a plaintiff is able to prove that the agency’s stated reasons for 
acting were not its ‘real’ reasons, then the plaintiff has proved that the agency’s decision was not 
‘reasonably explained’ as the APA requires it to be.”). 
 134. Id. at 660 (“[T]he evidence is clear that Secretary Ross’s rationale was pretextual — that is, 
that the real reason for his decision was something other than the sole reason he put forward in his 
Memorandum, namely enhancement of DOJ’s VRA enforcement efforts.  As the Court noted above, 
judicial review of agency action ‘requires that the grounds upon which the . . . agency acted be 
clearly disclosed.’”). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019). 
 137. See, e.g., Jagers v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., 758 F.3d 1179, 1185-86 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that a subjective desire to adopt a rule does not invalidate a result if objective evidence 
supported the agency’s conclusion). 
 138. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019) (“[A]gencies must pursue their 
goals reasonably. Reasoned decisionmaking under the Administrative Procedure Act calls for an 
explanation for agency action. What was provided here was more of a distraction.”). 
 139. Id. at 2573–74. 
 140. Id. 
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(2)  Agencies must “disclose the basis” for their decisions.141 
 
(3)  “[A] court may not set aside an agency’s policymaking 
decision solely because it might have been influenced by political 
considerations” or other administration priorities.142 
 
(4)  Courts should only examine the actual “‘mental processes of 
administrative decisionmakers’” if there has been a “‘strong 
showing of bad faith or improper behavior.’”143 
 
Statements (1) and (2) seem to be the most plainly at odds, but are not 
when one considers the distinction between a basis and a reason.  The basis 
for an agency decision is the legal support on which the action is 
established.144  The reason for the action is the cause that led to the effect of 
the rule’s adoption. 
Once one understands the distinction between “basis” and “reason,” the 
Department of Commerce rule on pretext becomes much more intelligible.  
A court may examine “the mental processes of [the agency] decisionmakers” 
if there is “a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.”145  Once that 
showing has been made, the court can order discovery about the agency 
decisionmaker’s process.146  If the agency’s stated reason played an 
“insignificant” role in the decision, it is a pretextual action, and therefore in 
violation of the APA.  
While that rule may be doctrinally complicated, it is at least intelligible.  
The district court’s rule was far simpler, but much further reaching—if the 
rationale is not truthful, the agency’s action is invalid.  Under that rule, if the 
stated rationale plays some role in the decision-making process, but is not the 
“main” reason for the action, the action can be overturned. 
It is worth noting that the Roberts opinion does not spell this rule out.  
Indeed, the opinion includes dicta that seems to promise a stricter rule than it 
actually endorses.  For example, Roberts wrote: “The reasoned explanation 
requirement of administrative law . . . is meant to ensure that agencies offer 
genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized 
by courts and the interested public.  Accepting contrived reasons would 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 2753–74 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 
(1971)). 
 144. See Basis, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/basis (last 
visited May 20, 2021). 
 145. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). 
 146. Id. 
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defeat the purpose of the enterprise.”147  The overall impression of this quote 
is that agencies have to be “genuine” in explaining their decisions, but 
Roberts made clear earlier that courts should not overturn an agency action 
if the agency has additional “unstated” reasons for acting.148  One could read 
this dicta narrowly and keep it consistent with the overall rule by interpreting 
“genuine justifications” as “justifications that played a role in the 
decision.”149  That interpretation is, at best, strained and misleading, and at 
worst a politician-like attempt to say something true only in a very narrow 
sense.  For example, a supervisor might fire an employee who refused his 
romantic advances upon finding out she also had a bad performance 
evaluation.  The evaluation is relevant—the supervisor figured it would serve 
as an adequate justification—but it is hard to call it a “genuine” justification.  
There are other instances like this where Roberts’s opinion never quite 
contradicts itself, but seems to overpromise the level of forthrightness to 
which courts will hold agencies.150 
2. Easy Facts on Pretext, Arguable Facts on Substance 
The district court’s findings of fact made it relatively easy for the 
Roberts pretext doctrine to invalidate the Commerce Department’s actions, 
even under an ill-defined rule.  By contrast, declaring the citizenship question 
arbitrary and capricious on substance would have been more ideologically 
challenging and required a greater degree of trust in expertise than Chief 
Justice Roberts was comfortable with.151  
Distilled down, the district court found that the Department had 
conspired to produce a fake justification, then testified to Congress that the 
fake justification was the only reason for the action.  After producing an 
administrative record for its decision, the Department filed a supplemental 
memorandum in court to change incorrect assertions in the administrative 
record.152  That supplemental memorandum made it easy to justify additional 
discovery into the actual reasons for the decision.153  The subsequent 
additional discovery produced a torrent of embarrassing emails and other 
 
 147. Id. at 2575–76. 
 148. Id. at 2573, 2575. 
 149. Id. at 2575. 
 150. See, e.g., id. at 2575 (“[T]he decision to reinstate a citizenship question cannot be 
adequately explained in terms of DOJ’s request for improved citizenship data to better enforce the 
VRA,” suggesting that the proffered explanation must adequately explain the action taken.). 
 151. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 
7 (2019) (describing the Roberts Court’s distrust of administrative power). 
 152. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 153. Id. at 548. 
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documents showing the conscious development of a pretextual rationale, 
even when the case was pending before the Supreme Court.154  
In the district court’s telling, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross 
announced on March 26, 2018 that he would add a citizenship question to the 
2020 Census in response to a December 12, 2017 request from the 
Department of Justice for better citizenship data to help it enforce Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) of 1965.155  The Secretary “testified before 
Congress, under oath, that DOJ’s request was the ‘sole[]’ reason for his 
decision.”156  Then, in a “Supplemental Memorandum,” the Secretary said he 
began considering “whether to reinstate a citizenship question” soon after his 
appointment.157  He also said that he and his staff already thought the 
citizenship question could be warranted and “inquired whether the 
Department of Justice . . . would support, and if so would request, inclusion 
of a citizenship question.”158  
This supplemental memorandum led the court to authorize further 
discovery, which found that the Secretary and his aides had gone to 
“extraordinary lengths” to “generate a request for the question.”159  Ross had 
reportedly requested a citizenship question as early as March 10, 2017 and 
then sent a follow up email in May asking why nothing had been done.160  
One of the Secretary’s aides “set out to find a ‘legal rationale’” regardless of 
whether it was the actual reason for acting.161  Those efforts included advising 
and ghostwriting for DOJ personnel completely separate from enforcement 
of the VRA.162  After Attorney General Jeff Sessions directed DOJ personnel 
to send the VRA request letter, he then prohibited DOJ personnel from 
meeting with Census Bureau personnel to discuss alternative ways to obtain 
citizenship data other than a citizenship question on the Census.163  
All of the above points to the VRA explanation being pretextual, but 
does not necessarily prove that the VRA explanation would otherwise be 
arbitrary or capricious, which was why Chief Justice Roberts had to reach the 
pretext question in the first place.  The liberal Justices pointed to additional 
 
 154. See Hansi Lo Wang, Emails Connect Census Official with GOP Strategist on Citizenship 
Question, NPR (June 15, 2019, 4:16 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/15/732669380/ 
emails-connect-census-official-with-gop-strategist-on-citizenship-question.  
 155. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 515. 
 156. Id. at 664. 
 157. Id. at 547–48. 
 158. Id. at 548 (alterations in original). 
 159. Id. at 663. 
 160. Id. at 549–50. 
 161. Id. at 551. 
 162. Id. at 555. 
 163. Id. at 556, 557. 
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evidence suggesting the Census Bureau itself argued against adding a 
citizenship question, which would increase costs significantly and yield 
worse data.164  Meanwhile, DOJ’s request for data to enforce the VRA could 
be met in other ways.165  However, Chief Justice Roberts believed that the 
Secretary could have still preferred the citizenship question to enforce the 
VRA because it would have reduced the number of people for whom the 
Census Bureau would have to estimate citizenship due to a lack of other 
available public records.166  The Census Bureau claimed it could develop a 
model to estimate the citizenship of that population accurately, but Chief 
Justice Roberts pointed out that it did not yet have such a model.167  Thus, in 
Chief Justice Roberts’s view, the Secretary could have decided a model might 
not work, and thus a citizenship question was warranted.168  
One can sense from the opinion how uncomfortable Chief Justice 
Roberts was with the idea of declaring a citizenship question arbitrary and 
capricious.  To do so would seem to flout common sense—how can a court 
find it totally unreasonable to ask a citizenship question when many other 
countries do so, the United States itself did so for many years, and the 
democratically-accountable administration has clearly made immigration 
enforcement an issue of paramount importance?169  Against all that is the thin 
reed that experts at the Census Bureau claimed they could do the stated job 
of VRA enforcement better with a statistical model, something the average 
citizen can barely wrap their mind around.170  Even if the experts are right, as 
seems quite likely from the facts, a Republican-appointed judge unfamiliar 
with statistics siding with agency experts over traditional common sense is 
unlikely to the point of futility.   
The easy facts on pretext and difficult facts on substance made this an 
ideal case for pretext doctrine.  In its supplemental memorandum, the 
Department admitted that it had not told the whole truth about the 
development of its rationale, a seemingly obvious showing of bad faith in the 
original rulemaking.171  With that bad faith showing, the district court could 
inquire into the Department’s actual decision-making process. The timeline 
of events in this case showed that the VRA rationale came well after the 
 
 164. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2590–91 (2019). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 2569–70. 
 167. Id. at 2570. 
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 169. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2596 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in part 
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Secretary had effectively made up his mind.172  The sole stated reason thus 
did not appear to play any role in the Department’s decision.  Ergo, under the 
Roberts doctrine, the rationale was pretextual, and the rulemaking was 
invalid. 
3. The Thomas Opinion 
Setting rhetoric aside, Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Gorsuch and 
Kavanaugh, disagreed on two factual points made in the Roberts opinion: (1) 
that there had been an adequate showing of bad faith to justify an inquiry into 
the Secretary’s decision-making process;173 and (2) that the Department’s 
stated rationale played no role in the actual decision-making.174  While Justice 
Alito wrote a separate opinion, it is of little consequence to the question of 
pretext, so I will focus my analysis on the Thomas opinion.175 
On the first point, Justice Thomas could not quite bring himself to say 
that there was no bad faith in the Commerce Department’s process.176  The 
evidence presented was simply not a “strong showing.”177  What would 
constitute a strong showing is never explained.  The single most important 
sentence in understanding why Justice Thomas found no bad faith is a bit of 
grumpy dicta:  
Echoing the din of suspicion and distrust that seems to typify 
modern discourse, the Court declares the Secretary’s memorandum 
“pretextual” because, “viewing the evidence as a whole,” his 
explanation that including a citizenship question on the census 
would help enforce the Voting Rights Act (VRA) “seems to have 
been contrived.”178   
The cri de coeur here expresses a simple point: If people were more 
trusting, as they should be, the Court would not have made such an erroneous 
ruling.  Justice Thomas trusted Secretary Ross sufficiently that he believed 
the evidence presented in this case should not have triggered an examination 
of pretext.  
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Dep’t of Com., 139 S.Ct at 2580. 
 174. Id. at 2581. 
 175. Justice Alito, writing only for himself, seems to have filed a separate opinion for two 
reasons: (1) to emphasize the policy arguments for asking a citizenship question; and (2) to argue 
that the APA should not apply to this particular agency action because the statute explicitly 
empowers the Secretary of Commerce to decide which questions to include on the Census.  Id. at 
2597–98 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Neither point is particularly important 
for purposes of this article. 
 176. See id. at 2580 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“This evidence fails 
to make a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.”). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 2576. 
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To Justice Thomas, the evidence that the Secretary already decided to 
add a citizenship question could be explained away with three rebuttals: (1) 
Ross’s emails showed an inclination to add a citizenship question rather than 
a decision; (2) Ross subsequently changed agency policy to use additional 
methods of data collection; and (3) the presumption of regularity ordinarily 
owed to agencies requires resolving any uncertainty in favor of the 
agencies.179  Unless the presumption of regularity means judges can never 
review for pretext—and Thomas remains barely agnostic on that point—
Justice Thomas’s disagreements with Chief Justice Roberts are factual, not 
doctrinal. 
Justice Thomas’s argument that there was no evidence that the 
Department’s stated rationale played no role at all in the actual decision-
making is mystifying if taken practically.  However, it makes more sense if 
viewed philosophically.  From a practical standpoint, the district court found 
that the VRA rationale played no role at all in the actual decision-making.180  
The Court reviewed that factual determination under the “clearly erroneous” 
standard.181  Justice Thomas’s opinion cited no evidence that VRA 
enforcement did factor into the Secretary’s decision, so it is difficult to see 
where the district court was “clearly erroneous.”  
From a more philosophical perspective, deciding whether some factor 
played a role in a decision depends on when exactly the decision is made.  If 
the decision is made when the Secretary signs off on the final printing of the 
rule, then the pretextual rationale will always play a significant role—the 
Secretary probably would not have signed the rule unless he thought it could 
survive legal scrutiny, so he did consider the rationale as part of his decision.  
This is the essence of Justice Thomas’s point that Secretary Ross changed the 
plan slightly late in the process, after the VRA rationale was supplied to 
him.182  In that way, the VRA rationale affected the final decision to print the 
rule.  On the other hand, if the “decision” is made when the Secretary was 
irrevocably committed to taking the action, that is truly an impossible 
moment to determine.  This is a problem we will examine more fully later in 
the Article, but for now it suffices to observe that an agency cannot truly 
commit to an action in any way other than issuing the final rule.183 
Justice Thomas’s opinion attacked the idea of pretext doctrine mainly 
through tone rather than clear disagreement.  At several points, he used 
rhetoric suggesting that he thought courts should not examine pretext, but he 
 
 179. Id. at 2581–83. 
 180. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 181. Dep’t of Com., 139 S.Ct at 2565. 
 182. Id. at 2582. 
 183. See infra Part I.F.4. 
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never quite said they should not.  He noted: “For the first time ever, the Court 
invalidates an agency action solely because it questions the sincerity of the 
agency’s otherwise adequate rationale.”184  He criticized the Court’s 
“unprecedented departure from our deferential review of discretionary 
agency decisions.”185  With consequentialist reasoning of the sort he 
ordinarily criticizes, he worried that the decision “would transform 
administrative law” and lead to “an endless morass of discovery and policy 
disputes not contemplated by the [APA].”186  As for actual discussion of 
pretext doctrine, Justice Thomas said: “Under ‘settled propositions of 
administrative law’ . . . pretext is virtually never an appropriate or relevant 
inquiry for a reviewing court to undertake.”187  In terms of literal meaning, 
“virtually never” is synonymous with “sometimes, but rarely.”  Therefore, 
Justice Thomas tacitly agreed with Chief Justice Roberts’s pretext doctrine 
by restating it with different emphasis. 
4. Loose End: When is an Agency Decision “Made” for Purposes of 
Pretext? 
The more one examines Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, the harder it is 
to explain how the Department’s action could be pretextual but not arbitrary 
and capricious.  How could a decision based on no legally sufficient factor 
not be arbitrary and capricious?  The heart of the apparent discrepancy seems 
to be inconsistency over what specific decision is being reviewed in either 
pretext doctrine or arbitrary and capricious review.  Chief Justice Roberts 
concluded that the Department’s VRA explanation was pretextual because 
the email evidence indicated that the Secretary had effectively already made 
up his mind and was merely seeking cover for it.188  In that interpretation of 
the facts, the decision to adopt the Census question was made at a point when 
the VRA explanation did not even exist.  Presumably, that decision was made 
without consideration of relevant facts because it seemed to predate the 
Department’s consideration of VRA enforcement.189  The Court has 
established that failure to consider relevant facts is arbitrary and 
capricious.190  However, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion held that adding the 
Census question was not arbitrary and capricious because the VRA 
 
 184. Id. at 2576. 
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explanation was sufficient.191  That analysis suggests that the relevant 
decision was the Department’s publishing of the final rule in the Federal 
Register.  Justice Thomas also used the Department’s publishing of the final 
rule as the moment of decision to argue that the VRA explanation was not 
pretextual.192 
There is not necessarily a clear right or wrong answer for which decision 
is more important.  However, evaluating pretext based on the final decision 
to publish would defeat the purpose of pretext review.  There is some value 
in choosing the final decision to sign off on and publish the rule—it is a 
clearly identifiable moment, and it is the only one that actually triggers 
regulatory consequences.193  However, that moment is not particularly 
relevant in determining actual motives.  Indeed, it would be difficult for an 
agency to ever run afoul of a rule against pretext if the only measuring 
moment was the final filing—the agency would have its pretext in hand when 
it issues the rule.  Arguably, an agency head who openly orders a subordinate 
to concoct a fake explanation prior to the actual issuance of the order would 
be acceptable because he at least considered the pretextual explanation prior 
to the “decision.”  Pretext doctrine only really makes logical sense if we think 
the real decision was made before the pretext was devised.  
It could be that arbitrary and capricious review and pretext review are 
focused on different things and thus different decision points should be 
evaluated.  If one conceives of arbitrary and capricious review as observing 
the formalities of rulemaking and pretext review as getting at harder to 
perceive process fouls, it would make sense for the former to focus on the 
final decision and the latter to survey the process as a whole.  Regardless of 
the decision point chosen, future cases will have to make clear which is being 
evaluated.  
5. Loose End: What is the Statutory Basis for Pretext Review? 
A first-semester law student reading Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
would struggle to answer a simple question: What specific provision of law 
is Chief Justice Roberts alleging that the Department of Commerce 
violated?194  As discussed above, the APA does not explicitly cover “pretext,” 
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and seemingly the only logical provision that would apply is judicial review 
of agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of 
discretion.”195  The district court in Department of Commerce, however, 
found that the decision to add a citizenship question rather than collect data 
through “more effective and less costly means” was arbitrary and capricious, 
and independently found that the decision was pretextual.196  The court 
organized various arbitrary and capricious violations in one section of the 
decision, and fielded the pretext argument in a separate section.197  The 
pretext section cites no specific statutory basis for ruling the citizenship 
question invalid, but does cite Supreme Court cases from 1943 and 1962 for 
the proposition that “judicial review of agency action ‘requires that the 
grounds upon which the . . . agency acted be clearly disclosed.’”198  Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion held that the Secretary’s decision was “not arbitrary 
and capricious,” but upheld the district court’s ruling on pretext.199  Justice 
Thomas’s dissent noted that the Supreme Court has “never held an agency 
decision arbitrary and capricious on the ground that its supporting rationale 
was ‘pretextual.’”200 
This loose end may ultimately prove more interesting for its political 
implications than for its effect on cases.  Why does it matter what specific 
part of the APA was violated if the ultimate outcome remains the same?  As 
with a murder mystery, we can attempt to answer this question by examining 
motives.  Why would the district court separate pretext from arbitrary and 
capricious review?  One possible reason is that courts endlessly restate how 
deferential arbitrary and capricious review is.201  If “pretext” is not a subset 
of arbitrary and capricious review, then the agency does not necessarily 
warrant the same deference in the pretext analysis.  Setting pretext apart 
allows the Court to uphold the pretext holding without flouting the high 
deference normally paid to agencies.  The Court also then has a middle 
ground between finding the action arbitrary and capricious and upholding it 
altogether. 
Chief Justice Roberts faced a different set of incentives for separating 
pretext and arbitrary and capricious review.  As described above, this case 
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not only presented a bad set of facts for the Department, but also a tough set 
of facts for a Republican appointee.  The Chief Justice may have wanted to 
reverse the agency action in this case because of how egregious it was, 
without forbidding a citizenship question in the future.  Making a ruling 
based on pretext also limits the precedential impact of this case.  Arbitrary 
and capricious review, after all, applies to virtually every administrative law 
case.  The relatively newfangled pretext review only triggers where there is 
a showing of bad faith, something that has more often been an issue during 
the Trump administration.202  This theory is essentially what Justice Thomas 
was suggesting when he said the Court was applying “an administration-
specific standard.”203 
6. Loose End: How Can an Agency Fix a Rule Struck Down for 
Pretext? 
While the rule on pretext emerging from Department of Commerce is 
not prohibitively difficult to discern, at least three messy problems are 
evident in the ruling: (1) what is the ultimate remedy for a pretextual agency 
action; (2) realistically, how can we ever be certain that a consideration 
played no role in agency decision-making; and (3) does the Roberts pretext 
doctrine provide the best practicable rule?  The latter two questions are 
complicated enough that they will be addressed at length later in the 
Article,204 but the first is an immediate practical issue in the Department of 
Commerce case. 
In Department of Commerce, the Court ultimately remanded the case 
back to the Department for further development of the administrative record, 
which comports with the ordinary result when plaintiffs win an APA arbitrary 
and capricious claim against an agency.205  There are exceptions to the 
general rule, however.  If a court finds that the record does not support an 
agency’s decision, but the record is “fully developed,” there is no point in 
remanding.206  This raises the pertinent issue for pretext analysis: What is the 
point in remanding?  In a somewhat similar 2009 district court case, the court 
justified remanding to the agency for further consideration because there was 
a new agency head who could, presumably, clear up the issue of pretext.207 
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It is easier to recite the current status of the citizenship question 
litigation than to explain what the agency can or cannot do now.  The 
controlling opinion for Department of Commerce affirmed the ruling of the 
district court on pretext.  The federal government conceded at the district 
court level that if the decision was ruled pretextual, it “would be a basis for” 
relief under the APA.208  The rule has been remanded back to the Department 
to provide a non-pretextual rationale.209  Practically speaking, it is too late to 
add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census, so the issue is moot.  However, 
if there is to be a logical doctrine of pretext, a court will eventually have to 
decide what, if anything, an agency can do to cure a rule overturned under 
pretext doctrine.  
6.1.  Option 1: Agency Can Reissue the Rule Immediately with a 
Minimal Additional Paper Trail 
Chief Justice Roberts and the four other conservative justices have 
already declared the Department’s stated rationale acceptable except for the 
pretext problem.210  However, pretext is only examined if there has been a 
previous showing of bad faith in the rulemaking process.  The Department 
could, in theory, put all the discovery from the first rulemaking into a new 
administrative record, add an explanation that it has now thoroughly 
considered the matter, cite a few pieces of new evidence, and add a 
citizenship question again.  It would be difficult to see where the showing of 
bad faith would come from in that case.  In essence, the Secretary would be 
declaring: “This explanation was originally pretextual, but I have considered 
it thoroughly, and for this new rulemaking, it is the true, accurate reason why 
I am taking this action.”  President Trump could have even replaced Wilbur 
Ross with a new Secretary to thoroughly disinfect the original pretext 
problem. 
Recall that in Department of Commerce’s lower court proceedings, 
Judge Furman stated that “there is no basis in the record to conclude that 
Secretary Ross ‘actually believe[d]’ the rationale he put forward, . . . and a 
solid basis to conclude that he did not.”211  On a hypothetical second go-
around, the Secretary could simply state repeatedly that he viewed VRA 
enforcement as crucial.  He could ask for detailed memos on the subject of 
VRA enforcement.  He could engage in theater sufficiently elaborate such 
that any judge would be forced to admit there is at least some basis to 
conclude the Secretary actually believed the VRA enforcement rationale. 
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While this might seem a cynical response to the pretext ruling, there is 
no obvious reason it would not suffice.  Given that five justices have 
approved the stated rationale for the citizenship question, it seems obvious 
that VRA enforcement played some role in the agency’s final publication of 
the citizenship question.  If a new rulemaking begins with the VRA 
enforcement rationale already in hand, the explanation is not obviously 
pretextual under the Roberts doctrine.  This option also mirrors what happens 
to most rules remanded to agencies for arbitrariness:  Agencies usually end 
up achieving the same goal after remand; they simply have to go through the 
regulatory process again and remedy whatever procedural defect led to the 
remand in the first instance.212 
6.2.  Option 2: Agency Can Reissue the Rule Eventually if it Cites 
a Different Explanation 
Courts could be strict and decide that a rule based on a pretextual 
rationale cannot be re-issued soon after being rejected.  Applied to the 
Department of Commerce case, the pretext doctrine might have prohibited 
the Trump Commerce Department from simply using the same voting rights 
explanation for a citizenship question on the Census, but a future presidency 
(or agency head) not tainted by bad-faith process could use that explanation. 
While this precise scenario has not arisen, in at least one case, a court found 
the replacement of an agency head a relevant step in curing a bad-faith 
process.213 
While it would be difficult to enforce strict boundaries on such a 
doctrine, it would also not be difficult for a hypothetical future Trump 
Commerce Department to avoid the doctrine’s teeth.  The Thomas and Alito 
opinions both hint that a national security explanation for a citizenship 
question would pass muster.214  With a minimal amount of competence, the 
Department could ask the FBI or CIA for data on crimes or espionage 
activities by foreigners in the United States, note that citizenship data could 
be useful in more efficiently distributing funding for anti-espionage law 
enforcement or preventing crimes by non-citizens, and reissue the rule. 
Like Option 1, Option 2 raises questions about the purpose of pretext 
review.  Effectively, it would be a penalty of time, not substance.  The 
agencies would have to jump through some paperwork hoops to reach a 
 
 212. William S. Jordan, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal 
Rulemaking? 60 (Draft Paper, 1998), https://ssrn.com/abstract=140798. 
 213. See Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 214. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2581, 2596 (2019) (“No one disputes that it 
is important to know how many inhabitants of this country are citizens.”). 
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predetermined conclusion later than they would have if the courts had not 
reviewed for pretext in the first place. 
6.3.  Option 3: The Agency Cannot Reissue the Rule 
The Roberts pretext doctrine, as applied by lower courts, could prevent 
an agency from issuing a substantively identical rule that has been previously 
disqualified on grounds of pretext, even if it offers a different rationale the 
second time around.215  This is obviously the most draconian possible 
outcome, but consider that the other two options discussed essentially lead to 
the agency putting the same rule in place after conducting a paperwork 
exercise.  A competent agency would be able to issue a new administrative 
record and avoid the bad faith indicia the district court uncovered in the case 
of the citizenship question.  One could argue that the only way to give the 
doctrine teeth is to prevent agencies from easily remedying the flaws 
identified in court. 
The problem with this approach is that it explicitly allows courts to 
overturn good, substantively justified policies simply because the agency 
acted in an underhanded way at some point in the past.  The courts would be 
depriving the country at-large of the benefits of whatever policy is being 
considered.  Of course, if agencies had resorted to pretextual rationales for 
the rule, it is more likely that the rule itself would not bring tremendous 
benefits—if there were obvious benefits, why not just cite those as the 
rationale in the first place?  Nevertheless, to the extent an agency rule would 
be justified but for pretext, there is likely some cost to judicial intervention.216   
Lower courts have not yet made significant progress in sketching out a 
rule of pretext, but it seems likely that various lower courts would choose all 
of the possible options.217  However, it will take quite some time before a 
clear split emerges simply because of the cumbersome rulemaking and 
judicial review process.  In Department of Commerce, the Court’s ruling 
came over two years after the Secretary started asking his staff to come up 
with some rationale for a citizenship question that would survive judicial 
 
 215. This would be similar to the consequences of an agency action being overturned by the 
Congressional Review Act.  The agency is barred from re-issuing the same rule.  See 5 U.S.C. 
§§801–8. 
 216. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. at 2571 (expounding on the downside of 
substituting a court’s judgment for an agency’s). 
 217. Courts addressing pretext in cases since 2019 have mostly done so in the course of 
authorizing additional discovery, not in actually disposing of a case.  See, e.g., Sweet v. Devos, No. 
C 19-03674 WHA, 2020 WL 6149690, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020) (authorizing expedited 
discovery); see also Cook Cty., Illinois v. Wolf, 461 F. Supp. 3d 779, 795 (N.D. Ill. 2020), motion 
to certify appeal denied, No. 19 C 6334, 2020 WL 3975466 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2020) (authorizing 
additional discovery because of the suspicion of pretext). 
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scrutiny.218  Putting aside the fact that the proximity of the 2020 Census made 
new action virtually impossible, if another agency facing a similar decision 
on pretext had to come up with a new rule, it might take another two years to 
reach a final litigation outcome.  Even if that agency takes less time for its 
rulemaking the second time around, a new president might come into office 
and scuttle the effort anyway.219 
II. WHAT PRETEXT ACTUALLY MEANS AND WHY IT MATTERS 
It may seem strange that one can discuss the case law around pretext in 
agency rulemaking without fully understanding what “pretext” would mean 
in this context or why anyone should worry about it in the first place.  As we 
have seen, the concept is new enough that its contours have not been defined 
in any meaningful way by the courts.220  Now that the Supreme Court has 
ruled that pretext can violate the APA, litigants will map the borders of 
pretext in subsequent cases.  By thoroughly examining the meaning now, we 
can foresee where courts may eventually draw those borders.  The single 
largest, seemingly insurmountable, philosophical problem with agency 
pretext is that an entire organization rarely has a unified reason for its action.  
The President, the agency head, the political staff, and the career staff at an 
agency all may have different reasons for acting, creating complicated 
mixtures of legitimate and illegitimate rationales.221  Some agency practices 
that seem like obvious examples of pretextual reasoning are more pernicious 
than others.  Ultimately, my proposed solution is to find impermissible 
pretext only where there is strong evidence that the impetus for change came 
from the higher echelons of agency authority for reasons unrelated to the 
legally acceptable explanation supplied from lower political and career staff. 
A. What is “Pretext” for Agencies? 
Establishing exactly what we mean by “pretext” for agencies is far more 
complicated than what it means for an individual.  The word “pretext” is 
loaded with connotations, but simply denotes “a purpose or motive alleged 
or an appearance assumed in order to cloak the real intention or state of 
 
 218. Dep’t of Com. V. New York, 139 S. Ct. at 2574 (describing the Secretary’s efforts as 
beginning when he entered office, which was in January 2017). 
 219. President Biden has already withdrawn several Trump-era rules.  See, e.g., Independent 
Contractor Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): Withdrawal, Federal Register, 86 
FR 24303 (May 6, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/05/06/2021-
09518/independent-contractor-status-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act-flsa-withdrawal. 
 220. See supra Part I. 
 221. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. at 2573 (stating that agency policymaking 
decisions can be affected by political considerations or presidential interest without violating the 
APA). 
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affairs.”222  Black’s Law Dictionary offers: “A false or weak reason or motive 
advanced to hide the actual or strong reason or motive.”223  When applied to 
an individual, a “pretext” is merely a specific kind of lie, specifically a lie 
about the reason the individual took an action.  The concept of pretext 
presupposes that individuals can meaningfully discern their “true” reason or 
reasons for taking an action.  While some scientists might contest that 
assertion,224 many areas of criminal and civil law have already established 
doctrines for discerning an individual’s reasons for acting.225  An agency writ 
large does not have the same unified will as an individual.  While agencies 
do offer a clear stated rationale for rules, it is not clear how one would 
identify a “true” rationale. 
The following five scenarios illustrate the difficulty in discerning 
pretext in agency actions: 
Scenario 1.  A President wants to damage a political rival who owns a 
coal mining company.  He directs the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”), in explicit terms, to create a rule that would hurt the rival’s 
company.  The EPA Administrator comes up with an idea for a rule and 
directs her staff to produce a cost-benefit analysis.  The analysis shows the 
rule would be beneficial.  The Administrator decides to issue the rule.  EPA’s 
various Federal Record publications make no mention of the presidential 
directive. 
Scenario 1 is the most straightforward example imaginable, but even 
this scenario has room for ambiguity.  The “action” that must be explained is 
the issuance of the rule.  By common understanding and dictionary definition, 
the EPA’s explanation for why it took the action is a pretext—it does not 
disclose the true motivation.  Intuitively, we know the true reason is that the 
President ordered the EPA to issue the rule, and the Administrator knew she 
was taking the action for illicit reasons.  There is a nagging unknown in this 
scenario, however: the cost-benefit analysis gave a potentially independent 
reason to issue the rule.  It is indeterminate whether the president’s order by 
itself caused the Administrator to issue the rule, or whether the subsequent 
analysis caused the Administrator to issue the rule.  We might surmise that 
the analysis was influenced by a desire to obtain a certain outcome, a situation 
 
 222. Pretext, Miriam Webster Online (last visited May 20, 2021), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/pretext.  
 223. Pretext, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 224. See, e.g., Kerri Smith, Brain Makes Decisions Before You Even Know It, NATURE (Apr. 11, 
2008), https://www.nature.com/news/2008/080411/full/news.2008.751.html.  
 225. To take one obvious example, the difference between first and second-degree murder in 
many jurisdictions hinges on the offender’s motive.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (2020) 
(defining first degree murder as “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing” and second degree 
murder as all other kinds of murder). 
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that true scientists work painstakingly to avoid.  However, we do not know 
at the outset if EPA would have ultimately taken the same action if the 
analysis had come out differently. 
It is not clear under the Roberts doctrine announced in Department of 
Commerce whether this would constitute an example of pretext that would 
violate the APA.226  First, a litigant would need to find evidence of bad faith 
by the EPA.  Note that the EPA did not necessarily show bad faith here—the 
President did when he ordered the EPA to hurt his rival’s company.  The 
Administrator simply came up with an idea and had an analysis drawn up.  
Assuming that a court would find bad faith in the process, the court could 
authorize investigation of the Administrator’s mental state.  If the court found 
that the Administrator felt justified in issuing the rule based on the cost-
benefit analysis, it would not matter under the Roberts doctrine whether she 
also acted because the President told her to.  
Scenario 2.  The Secretary of Homeland Security feels a deep moral 
obligation to help victims of a hurricane in another country.  She assigns her 
staff to devise a rationale for why granting victims of a hurricane Temporary 
Protected Status in the United States is in the national interest.227  Her staff 
comes up with a national security justification that plays no role in the 
Secretary’s decision.  When asked by Congress why she offered the aid, she 
offers only the national security explanation. 
Scenario 2 is essentially a benign pretext, which raises the question of 
whether a pretext must be nefarious to warrant scrutiny.  On one hand, 
excusing this scenario’s explanation as benign raises thorny moral and 
methodological problems.  Immigration opponents frequently rail against 
Temporary Protected Status;228 to them, the action would not seem benign at 
all.  Allowing judges to decide for themselves what motivations are benign 
is, at best, anti-democratic.  At worst, it gives a judge’s moral intuitions the 
force of law.  On the other hand, punishing benign pretexts raises a fair 
question: What motivations are not, at some level, pretextual?  The scenario 
stipulates that the head of the Agency feels a moral compulsion to help 
victims of natural disasters.  But what if she developed that moral intuition 
by seeing through years of experience that the benefits of aid outweigh the 
costs?  After all, if morality is a coarsely calibrated cost-benefit analysis, why 
 
 226. See supra Part I.F.1. 
 227. Temporary Protected Status protects a foreign national from removal from the United States 
and makes them eligible for employment authorization.  See Temporary Protected Status, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-
status (last accessed May 20, 2021). 
 228. See, e.g., Andrew R. Arthur, ‘Temporary’ Protected Status: The Biggest Misnomer in 
Immigration, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (October 31, 2017), https://cis.org/Arthur/Temporary-
Protected-Status-Biggest-Misnomer-Immigration.  
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should it be disqualifying if her moral hunch is subsequently confirmed by a 
more rigorous analysis?  One can resolve this dilemma only by a complicated 
hierarchy of pretexts, where venal pretexts like personal gain receive closer 
scrutiny than seemingly benign pretexts. 
This is one of the hardest scenarios to evaluate under the Roberts 
doctrine from Department of Commerce.  Could there truly be a showing of 
bad faith in a case like this, which would be the prerequisite to even 
entertaining a pretext allegation?  I could not find any case like this, most 
likely because few people would sue an agency for acting on a humanitarian 
impulse.  However, if offering deliberately misleading explanations counts 
as “bad faith,” then such an action could be invalidated on pretext grounds.  
Scenario 3.  An opportunistic politician secured her party’s nomination 
for President by promising to do something about climate change despite 
having no personal feelings one way or the other on the subject.  Once elected 
President, she directs the EPA to write a rule limiting carbon emissions.  The 
EPA writes an exhaustive justification for the action and conducts a thorough 
cost-benefit analysis and citing hundreds of authoritative scientific studies 
suggesting the action is necessary to avert catastrophe. 
This scenario blurs the lines of personal and public motivations.  At one 
level, the opportunistic politician’s motivation is venal and personal—she 
wants to maintain power by issuing the rule.  However, maintaining an 
alliance of disparate interest groups is essentially the function of a politician 
in a democratic system.  Functionally, there is no difference between a 
principled politician whose views happen to align with enough interest 
groups to constitute a majority and a pandering politician who manages to 
satisfy enough interest groups to constitute a majority.  The EPA’s 
explanation is obviously pretextual in the sense that neutral rationale did not 
originally motivate the action, but it is not at all clear whether we should 
consider this a “benign” pretext. 
The role of “bad faith” in the Roberts doctrine and its predecessors plays 
a key role here.  If bad faith is simply misstating the rationale for why 
something happened, then this action could be reviewed on pretext grounds.  
If judges are allowed to decide for themselves that certain motives do not 
constitute bad faith, then pretext would not enter into the picture.  Of course, 
that outcome would open up another can of worms—what motivations do not 
count as “bad faith”?  Are judges allowed to be more sympathetic to a cause 
that experts generally champion—like action on climate change—than base, 
populist actions like a citizenship question on the Census? 
Scenario 4.  The President appoints a popular figure with little expertise 
to serve as Secretary of the Interior.  Career employees at the Department of 
the Interior inform the Secretary that they have conducted careful research 
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and think the Department should disallow the use of jet skis on waterways 
within parks owned by the federal government.  The Secretary has no opinion 
on the subject, but issues the suggested order because he does not want to 
antagonize the career employees. 
Like Scenario 3, this set of facts lays bare difficult ambiguities with 
motivations, but in a subtle manner.  An initial question emerges: Whose 
motivation actually matters for determining whether an explanation was 
pretextual?  The Secretary is the actual decisionmaker, and there are several 
equally true ways to describe his motivation: (a) he issued the rule for venal 
personal gain because he wanted to curry favor with the career employees; 
(b) he relied on the expert opinion of career employees in exactly the 
technocratic way one would theoretically want; and (c) he acted randomly in 
that he did not particularly care what the rule was, just whether the career 
employees liked it.  If we look to the agency writ large instead of the actual 
decisionmaker, we might be able to fashion a coherent explanation.  The 
Department’s motive as an organization was the ostensibly neutral, expert 
opinion of the career employees—their opinion drove the Secretary.  Note 
that this way of looking at the problem only works if we view the 
Department’s employees as faceless automatons.  If the record revealed that 
the expert career employees had their own motivations for their 
recommendations, the entire pretext discussion would begin anew, but even 
further removed from the actual decisionmaker. 
The Roberts doctrine does not offer a clear answer on this scenario.  
First, there is the same question raised in previous scenarios as to whether 
there could be a showing of “bad faith.”  Assuming there is such a showing, 
the second question is whether the public rationale played a role in the 
decision, and the answer is a resounding “it depends.”  Did the Secretary 
consider the rationale, or did he merely consider the fact that his career staff 
had recommended it?  Is there some requirement that the decisionmaker have 
an understanding of the substance of the rationale rather than simply the 
identity of the people who recommended it?  This may seem like a contrived 
scenario, but agency decisionmakers make many decisions based on the 
advice of career staff for the obvious reason that the career staff know far 
more about the nuts-and-bolts of the issue area. 
Scenario 5.  The President appoints a conscientious scientist to serve as 
Administrator of the EPA.  News reports indicate a chemical in a lawn care 
product called RoundDown may cause cancer.  The Administrator tells his 
underlings to conduct a detailed study on whether the chemical should be 
banned.  He fully intends to follow their recommendation.  On the day their 
report is due, the President tweets, “I never liked RoundDown because the 
company that makes it once sued my company.  I am hereby ordering EPA 
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to ban RoundDown.  Take that, losers!”  Right after the administrator reads 
the tweet, he opens the report and learns that the EPA staff recommended 
banning RoundDown. 
This is the true nightmare scenario philosophically.  If the action 
proceeds, it is very difficult for anyone to credibly believe agency 
justifications.  Legally speaking, the Administrator issues the rules, not the 
President, so theoretically his opinion is not relevant.229  But that is a very 
thin reed in the real world, where the President can remove almost all officers 
in the federal government for virtually any reason whatsoever.  If he does not 
want to remove an officer, he can practically eliminate their authority through 
public shaming or controlling access to resources.230 Indeed, the unitary 
executive theory suggests that all inferior officers of the government must be 
exercising the President’s will.  If the EPA Administrator is not implementing 
the President’s will, where did the Administrator derive the power to execute 
the law? 
It seems obvious that there is bad faith occurring in this scenario, but it 
would depend on how courts view the role of the President in administrative 
decision-making.  In theory, the EPA Administrator does not have to follow 
the President’s orders, but the President can also simply remove the 
Administrator whenever he wants.  Perhaps it would be more accurate to say 
that the President strongly recommends that the EPA take an action.  If we 
focus on why the Administrator takes action, there is presumably a record in 
this scenario indicating that the Administrator is acting, at least in part, based 
on the legal rationale.  Under the Roberts doctrine, if the legal rationale plays 
at least some role in the decision-making process, then the rule stands even if 
there are other unspoken reasons.231  However, one could imagine a more 
difficult scenario where the EPA is in the middle of evaluating the facts when 
the President orders the EPA to take action. 
To summarize, these scenarios present a number of conceptual 
difficulties with “pretext.”  First, what decision are we seeking the true 
explanation for—the decision to embark upon making a rule, or the decision 
to issue a final rule?  Second, should we consider an explanation pretextual 
if there is any alternative consideration not disclosed by the agency, even a 
seemingly moral one?  Third, does any hidden rationale constitute bad faith, 
including a decisionmaker’s potential apathy or deference to career 
 
 229. This is why the discussion in Department of Commerce focused on the Secretary’s 
motivations, not the President’s.   
 230. See, e.g., Dan Mangan and Kevin Breuninger, Trump Tweets: ‘Disgraceful’ that Sessions 
Kicked Surveillance Probe to Obama Appointee, CNBC (Feb. 28, 2018) (noting the President’s 
public criticism of his Attorney General). 
 231. See supra Part I.F.1. 
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employees?  Finally, can a true, acceptable explanation be rendered 
pretextual through the interjection of a political actor such as the President or 
an agency head? 
A common law of “pretext” could emerge where judges answer at least 
some of these questions.  Perhaps agency action will be considered pretextual 
only if the actual dominant motivation is unacceptably unrelated to the legal 
motivation.  With that many layers of imprecise verbiage, however, finding 
pretext might simply indicate that a judge strongly disagrees with the 
underlying motivation.  
III. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST PRETEXT DOCTRINE 
As the above scenarios illustrate, there are major philosophical 
ambiguities in pretext doctrine.  That may explain why administrative law 
has been around for about a century without ever addressing the idea of 
pretext.  Given that courts did not feel a need for it until now, we must 
critically examine why the doctrine is necessary.  Some scholars argue that 
the Trump administration was uniquely incompetent or villainous.232  The 
dissenters in Department of Commerce seemed to indicate that there should 
be no pretext doctrine, at least not one imposed by the courts alone.233  Even 
the four liberal justices who signed on to Chief Justice Roberts’s pretext 
analysis indicated they would have held that the citizenship question was 
arbitrary and capricious regardless of whether it was pretextual.234  One could 
thus read Department of Commerce as showing that only one Justice thought 
a pretext doctrine was necessary to decide the outcome of the case.  
A. If There’s an Otherwise Adequate Legal Rationale, Why Should We 
Care About the Actual Rationale? 
Those who think federal courts should not examine agency rationales 
for pretext can muster a strong, simple argument.  At best, pretext doctrine 
punishes the country at-large for the thought crimes of the agencies.  At 
worst, the doctrine is so vague as to invite reversal of virtually any rule a 
court disagrees with.  The following premises are largely uncontroversial: 
 
Agencies have expertise in their issue area. 
 
 
 232. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory 
Slop and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651, 1669–86 (2019). 
 233. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct 2551, 2579 (2019) (“We have never before found 
Overton Park’s exception satisfied, much less invalidated an agency action based on ‘pretext.’”).  
 234. Id. at 2584. 
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Agencies have democratic legitimacy stemming from their 
connection to an elected President and confirmation of high 
officials by an elected Senate. 
 
Courts do not have expertise in agency issue areas. 
 
An agency rule that is not arbitrary or capricious under current 
doctrine must have a rational basis. 
 
Pretext doctrine would be aimed only at rules that are otherwise not 
arbitrary or capricious—rules that would survive APA review as it currently 
stands.  Reversal of a justified rule means adoption of a status quo that 
agencies have reason to believe is worse than the new rule.  A court reversing 
on grounds of pretext also does not necessarily believe that the status quo is 
a better policy than the new rule.  Of course, we might suspect that a judge 
reversing on grounds of pretext also does not believe in the policy under 
review, but in theory the doctrine does not require the judge to believe more 
in the status quo. 
A famous thought experiment called the “philosophical zombie” asks 
how we know other people have consciousness.  How would we, as external 
observers, differentiate between other people having consciousness and other 
people merely operating by automated processes of the brain?235  The point 
is that we could not tell from our external vantage.  For our present inquiry 
about pretext, one can similarly ask: What difference do we see between an 
agency that has a rich inner life of nefarious motives and an agency that issues 
the same rule with the same rationale, but actually believes the rationale?  As 
discussed earlier in the various potential scenarios of pretext, the extent to 
which an agency has a unified rationale in the first place is debatable.  Yet 
even if agencies have a “real” rationale that is not publicly endorsed, so long 
as they are adopting justified rules, it seems like it would be in the country’s 
interests to allow the rule to stand.236  
Logically, the objection to pretext must be that we want agencies to do 
the right thing for the right reasons, but that sort of philosophical objection 
almost never shows up in law because it is usually pointless.  For example, 
we do not ask if someone obeying the speed limit is doing so out of fear of 
punishment or an admirable desire to promote safety.  To care about the 
motivation of someone doing the right thing is both utopian and totalitarian.  
 
 235. Philosophical Zombie, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie 
(last visited July 19, 2019). 
 236. Cf. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (upholding agency 
action despite clear shortcomings of the agency’s explanation). 
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Of course, an individual can do the right thing in service of a crime—think 
of a bank robber driving the speed limit away from the scene of his crime.  
However, the bank robber’s motivation for following the law does not 
provide an independent ground for prosecution in that case. 
One example where motivation matters when performing an otherwise 
unobjectionable official act is bribery of public officials, which federal law 
prohibits even if the action performed might have an independent 
justification.237  However, the bribery statute requires a bad act (seeking or 
accepting something of benefit) in addition to the otherwise justifiable 
official action.  Returning to the philosophical zombie analogy, one can 
externally distinguish between an agency official conducting ordinary agency 
business and an agency official performing the same action because of a 
bribe.  The official does something in addition to the action—he receives or 
asks for payment.  Unless the agency decisionmaker confesses to offering a 
pretextual rationale at the moment she makes the decision being reviewed, 
there is no external manifestation to distinguish them from an agency 
decisionmaker acting with a non-pretextual rationale.  Pretext doctrine thus 
appears to be designed in a way that is uniquely bad for the country.  It is a 
philosophically muddled idea that only matters in cases where the agency 
action is otherwise justified. 
B. Can Pretext Doctrine Be Applied in a Non-Arbitrary Manner? 
Assume for the sake of argument that there are some rules that should 
be reversed even if they have adequate legal justification.  Before agreeing 
that we should have a doctrine to identify and reverse those rules, we should 
have some confidence that we can (a) identify those rules; (b) identify only 
those rules (i.e., generate few if any false positives); and (c) provide 
sufficiently clear guidance so as to be reliably useful for every federal district 
court in the country.  The Roberts pretext doctrine suggests that a rationale is 
pretextual if it plays an “insignificant” role in the actual decision-making 
process.  There are two layers of vagueness involved in this concept: (1) the 
inherent uncertainty as to when consideration becomes significant; and (2) 
what kinds of consideration should count for assessing significance.  
The first layer of vagueness is easy to understand—in any but the most 
extreme cases, significance or insignificance is purely contextual, necessarily 
defined in relation to a particular judge’s preconceived notions about the case 
at hand.  Consider a rule where the agency decisionmaker received a briefing 
on the legal rationale before issuing the final rule, but emailed every day 
about the allegedly “true” rationale for the rule (for example, its political 
 
 237. Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses, 18 U.S.C. § 201. 
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impact).  How is a judge to know whether the legal rationale played a 
significant role?  Does the agency decisionmaker need some 
contemporaneous documentation that they listened attentively to the briefing 
and found it useful?  Anyone who has ever briefed a superior knows that they 
sometimes completely ignore briefings, but other times have encyclopedic 
recall of a minute detail.  How is one to know whether the legal rationale 
played a significant role? 
The second layer of vagueness is subtler, pertaining more to what counts 
toward a particular rationale playing a “role.”  Imagine a situation in which 
an agency decisionmaker says something like: “Thank God there turned out 
to be a sufficient independent rationale for my action; I also dislike someone 
who will be disadvantaged by my agency’s action.”  In one sense, the legal 
rationale played no role in the agency head’s decision since he just wanted to 
use it to justify the action.  However, the fact that there was a justification 
played a hugely important role—the quote suggests the decisionmaker would 
not have taken the action without the legal justification.  The legal rationale 
is simultaneously pretextual and indispensable to the rulemaking process. 
Some amount of vagueness can be settled through federal common law 
establishing what constitutes a “significant“ role.  However, a concept as 
riddled with vagueness as “significant” roles in decision-making might allow 
every court virtually unlimited latitude to uphold or reverse any rule at will.  
These are the sorts of outcomes Justice Thomas warned against in his partial 
dissent in Department of Commerce.238 
C. Realpolitik: Is Pretext Doctrine Simply a Fig Leaf for Filtering Out 
Procedurally Awful Trump Administration Actions? 
The hoary admonition that hard cases make bad law might have 
reasonably applied to judicial oversight of the Trump administration.  Chief 
Justice Roberts may have rightly intended Department of Commerce to 
rectify one specific situation as surgically as possible by creating a 
circumscribed doctrine that future administrations can easily avoid now that 
they are on notice.  Indeed, this account jibes well with the rumor that Chief 
Justice Roberts originally planned to vote to overturn the lower court ruling 
against the Department, but changed his vote at the last minute when new 
email evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the VRA 
 
 238. Dep’t of Com., 139 S.Ct at 2576 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]f taken seriously as a rule of 
decision, this holding would transform administrative law. . . . Crediting these accusations on 
evidence as thin as the evidence here could lead judicial review of administrative proceedings to 
devolve into an endless morass of discovery and policy disputes not contemplated by the [APA].”) 
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explanation was pretextual.239  Roberts’s opinion remanded the citizenship 
question back to the Department, but one could support the outcome of 
Department of Commerce and still think pretext doctrine should be a one-off 
solution to a problem unique (so far) to the Trump administration. 
The argument from realpolitik is really two separate propositions.  One 
is that Department of Commerce itself presented a uniquely important case 
with a particularly ugly agency process.  The specific outcome of Department 
of Commerce was more important than a run-of-the-mill Supreme Court case 
because the Census dictates the apportionment of democratic power at the 
federal level.  The Department acted with such bad faith that judicial review 
of agency action would appear toothless and corrupt to the average citizen if 
the Court did not overturn the rule.  By dodging this particular bullet, the 
Court has bought the country ten more years to cool down and step back from 
the Stalingrad-esque total war between Republicans and Democrats, where 
every norm is shattered and even the Census is just another tool to extract 
political advantage.  
The other, slightly broader realpolitik argument is that the Trump 
administration created the need for new rules of judicial review of agency 
action.  One can view this argument as not being against pretext doctrine per 
se, but rather an acknowledgment that pretext doctrine will likely only affect 
extremely shoddy, dishonest rulemakings.  As briefly discussed earlier, 
Justice Thomas alleged in his partial dissent that Department of Commerce 
created an “administration-specific standard.”240  In his view, any 
administration might run afoul of the pretext rule, but it was only being 
applied against the Trump administration.  However, one could argue instead 
that the pretext rule has always existed, but it was only recently unearthed 
because the Trump administration was uniquely incompetent.241 
The common thread in these two arguments is that pretext doctrine, 
having been conjured into existence, can now be retired—or, at least, it could 
have been retired at the end of the Trump administration on January 20, 2021.  
While there is no need to overturn the doctrine, one could argue it should not 
be read as creating new onerous rules for agencies in future administrations.  
If the Trump administration was uniquely incompetent, it stands to reason 
that future administrations could avoid violating pretext doctrine even if the 
doctrine was not tailor-made for Department of Commerce.  For example, 
courts could interpret the requirement that the legal rationale play a 
 
 239. See Samuel Estreicher, “Pretext” and Review of Executive Decisionmaking in the 
Citizenship Census Question Case, VERDICT (July 9, 2019), https://verdict.justia.com/2019/07/09/ 
pretext-and-review-of-executive-decisionmaking-in-the-citizenship-census-question-case.  
 240. Dep’t of Com., 139 S.Ct at 2576–77 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 241. See e.g., Glicksman & Hammond, supra note 232, at 1669. 
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significant role as meaning only that the agency decisionmaker be aware of 
the legal rationale before making her decision.  Mere awareness could be 
proven by the agency decisionmaker ever having discussed the issue at hand 
in the legal rationale at some point.  In Department of Commerce, by contrast, 
there was no evidence that the Secretary had ever considered enforcement of 
the VRA by the time he ordered his underlings to find an acceptable rationale 
for inclusion of a citizenship question on the Census. 
D. The Argument for Pretext Doctrine 
Notwithstanding the objections raised above, there is, in fact, a purpose 
in punishing agencies for pretextual explanations: deterring agencies from 
abusing the deference accorded based on their expertise.242  The quick and 
dirty model of how agencies fit into the federal government is that Congress 
delegated its power in specific areas to agencies whose expertise allow them 
to make better and faster judgments than Congress.243  The APA and similar 
laws allow judges a check on the power of agencies, with the understanding 
that courts should ordinarily defer to agencies because of their expertise.244  
Because the agencies have greater expertise than the courts, agencies 
necessarily have the ability to “sell” certain rules to the courts that are not 
actually based on expertise.  
This is analogous to the relationship between a car owner and a 
mechanic.  A problem, familiar to any car owner, is that mechanics can abuse 
their expertise to sell unnecessary repairs to an ignorant owner.  Similarly, 
Judges, like car owners, cannot detect when they are being deceived. 
Agencies, like mechanics, can abuse this information mismatch by 
deceptively claiming actual expertise.  Pretext doctrine is a way to address 
the cases where a court has external evidence that the agency was not basing 
its decision on actual expertise.245  In the mechanic analogy, pretext doctrine 
addresses the narrow range of cases where the car owner overhears one 
mechanic saying to another, “I bet you can sell the car owner a new set of 
tires too if you say the tires look rough.”  Under arbitrary and capricious 
review without the pretext doctrine, one would simply ask if the mechanic 
had some basis for saying the tires looked rough, and whether the tires 
looking rough is correlated with needing new tires.  Analogically, pretext 
 
 242. This is akin to the exclusionary rule in criminal law, where the draconian sanction of totally 
excluding relevant evidence is meant to deter police misconduct.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
655–57. 
 243. See e.g., Eric Schlabs, The Problem with Delegation, REGUL. REV. (Dec. 2, 2015), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2015/12/02/schlabs-problem-with-delegation/.  
 244. See, e.g., Fox v. Clinton, 684 F.3d 67, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 245. See, e.g., Dep’t of Com., 139 S.Ct at 2574. 
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doctrine allows the owner (the judge) to distrust the advice of the mechanic 
even if the tires do look rough.  Just as it would be foolish for a car owner to 
ignore evidence of abuse by a mechanic, it would be foolish of courts not to 
use extrinsic evidence of bad faith to calibrate their deference to agencies.  
The owner can still take the tires, but at the very least he should accord less 
deference to the mechanic’s opinion than he otherwise would have. 
 
Figure 1: Identifying Actions Where Pretext Review is Helpful 
 
 
1. Pretext Doctrine is a Necessary Correction to the Trajectory of 
Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
To understand why pretext doctrine is necessary, we must first 
understand what function it would fill that is not currently served by arbitrary 
and capricious review.  Over the decades, since arbitrary and capricious 
review first came about, courts have slowly abstracted it away from looking 
into the real process by which the agency decision was made.  They have 
turned it into a box-checking exercise, showing the agency at least pretended 
to listen to public comment and was aware of the empirical reality of the issue 
at hand.  This is perhaps unsurprising: Any bureaucracy over time begins to 
sanctify habitual activities as rituals long after the activity has ceased to fulfill 
its original role.246  Pretext review, whether viewed as an amendment to 
arbitrary and capricious review or a totally different doctrine, forces judges 
in extreme cases to consider what process the agency actually followed to 
reach a decision. 
Arbitrary and capricious doctrine evolved pursuant to the incentives 
facing courts and agencies, with the result that the doctrine examines an 
 
 246. Michael A. Diamond, The Social Character of Bureaucracy: Anxiety and Ritualistic 
Defense, 6 POL. PSYCH. 663, 669–71 (1985).  
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idealized agency decision-making process.  The APA explicitly directs courts 
to examine whether agency activities are arbitrary and capricious.247  Courts 
naturally look at the data and documents relied upon by the agency—the so-
called administrative record.  Once simple in concept, the administrative 
record, predictably, took on a life of its own.  As agencies became aware that 
the “record” was what they would be judged on, they began not to produce a 
record at all, which in turn created cases like Overton Park.248  In Overton 
Park, the Court encouraged agencies to create a record—if the agency failed 
to produce a record, courts could order the deposition of senior officials or 
other probing measures to get at the truth.249  Forced to produce a record, 
agencies began to produce reams of data and empirical arguments.  Courts 
grew accustomed to relying on the administrative record, creating an 
evidentiary problem: How would one truly know whether the administrative 
record was complete and documented the true decision-making process?  
While there are doctrines allowing for augmentation of the record, they only 
come into effect on some sort of showing of bad faith, which creates a 
chicken-and-egg problem for litigants.  How can one find evidence of bad 
faith to justify further discovery without the court authorizing additional 
discovery in the first place?  And, without pretext doctrine, even if there was 
bad faith, what would be the ultimate goal of this additional discovery? 
Faced with the difficult task of determining when an administrative 
record is complete, courts have grown complacent, largely accepting the 
agency’s produced administrative record.250  Able to confine their review to 
the record, courts focus arbitrary and capricious review on whether the record 
itself seems to put forward a sufficient case—regardless of whether it is really 
a record of the agency’s true decision-making process.251  That normalizing 
of the “record” runs deep in administrative law and creates an atmosphere of 
artificiality, where agencies act for political reasons but feign detached 
expertise.  This phenomenon has generated dozens of law review articles 
either calling for acceptance of political justifications or calling for 
maintenance of apolitical records.252  These arguments ignore an even more 
fundamental question: whether agencies should be allowed to produce 
 
 247. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 248. See generally 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 249. Id. at 420.  
 250. See, e.g., Aram A. Gavoor & Steven A. Platt, Administrative Records and the Courts, 67 
U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2018) (describing the historical evolution of the administrative record). 
 251. Indeed, some courts went so far as to look beyond the administrative record to later court 
filings to discern a possible agency explanation.  E.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 
1361 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 252. See generally, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 
(2001). 
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anodyne-but-fictional accounts of why rules are adopted.  The normalization 
of the “record” explains how a purported foe of the administrative state like 
Justice Thomas could note with incredulity in Department of Commerce that 
the Court was taking the radical step of asking for the actual rationale from 
the agency.253  It is also unsurprising that appellate judges, accustomed to 
accepting a fact record from lower courts that roughly correspond to 
underlying truth, were quick to accept judicial review largely confined to the 
record. 
The smoothing out of arbitrary and capricious review into a tidy process 
where agencies produce a record and judges happily restrict their review to 
that record allows agencies to fake a higher level of expert guidance than they 
actually offer.  Pretext doctrine, whether conceived as a standalone doctrine 
or a new aspect of arbitrary and capricious review, grounds judicial review 
of agency action in the actual process agencies used to generate the rule.  It 
inherently requires looking beyond the record, and in so doing weakens the 
ability of agencies to abuse their expertise. 
2. Pretext Review Helps Guide Agencies Back to an Expertise-Based 
Model of Administration 
Abuse of agency expertise emerges from the inherent principal-agent 
problem between Congress and the administrative agencies.  Congress tasked 
agencies with perceiving and acting upon truth, founded on the actual data 
the agencies can gather about the real world and the impact of federal 
policies.  However, Congress has a typical principal-agent problem: It has 
different information and interests from the agencies.  How does it really 
know whether the agencies are acting consistent with Congress’s interests as 
manifested by the laws Congress has passed?  How does it know that the 
agencies are acting upon the best information?  The problem is rendered more 
complicated by the fact that agencies really have multiple principals: 
 
 253. One might wonder why conservative judges and justices seem less inclined to demand truth 
from agencies given the ideological hostility of conservatives to the administrative state.  While 
warranting more than a footnote’s worth of analysis, one possible explanation is a conservative 
distrust of expertise in any form.  A good agency, to a conservative theorist, is not one making the 
best technical judgments, but one that reliably does little and seeks to relinquish what authority it 
does have.  That may explain why, for example, the Trump administration appointed so many 
politicians and former lobbyists as agency heads rather than individuals with relevant scientific 
expertise in the field in question.  For example, former Texas Governor Rick Perry served as 
Secretary of Energy, to be succeeded by former lobbyist Dan Brouilette.  See Cecelia Smith-
Schoenwalder, Trump Announces Replacement for Energy Secretary Rick Perry, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD RPT. (Oct. 18, 2019, 4:26 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-
news/articles/2019-10-18/trump-picks-dan-brouillette-to-replace-energy-secretary-rick-perry. 
Under the preceding Obama administration, the position was held in succession by two Nobel-
laureate physicists.  
  
1070 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:1021 
 
Congress and the President, as represented by his political appointees.  In the 
modern era, agency nominees largely sail through the confirmation process 
as long as the party controlling the Senate is the same as the party controlling 
the White House, removing one of the main ways Congress can manage the 
principal-agent dilemma.  Pretext review removes one way in which agencies 
can pretend to serve their congressional principal while actually serving the 
executive principal.254 
Originally, agencies were a way to offload technical decisions from 
Congress to agencies.  They are now one of the primary means of effectuating 
partisan ends because it is increasingly difficult to get legislation through 
Congress.255  Now that the agencies are viewed as tools of the President, 
commentators feel a need to defend executive prerogatives.256  This is 
crucially important for understanding the impetus for pretext theory.  Courts 
will never have the technical expertise of agencies.  The democratic 
legitimacy of agencies arises from Congress’s delegation of power to them, 
a gift that was premised on the agencies’ technocratic nature.  A doctrine of 
pretext is an important tool for preventing agencies—or, more properly, 
Presidents—from abusing that power. 
Some critics of the regulatory state look askance at agency claims of 
expertise.257  To those critics, there is no such thing as neutral expertise, only 
shrouded political preferences or selfish desire to aggrandize power.  These 
critiques have a kernel of philosophical truth: Even career employees at 
agencies have political views, and they can have an interest in accumulating 
power through regulation.  However, critics of agencies take this basic truth, 
divorce it from any empirical assessment of agency bias, and then effectively 
conclude that there should be no limits on agency politicization because of 
the unitary executive model.258  If a democratically elected president uses 
agencies to advance his policies, these critics argue, we need not worry about 
 
 254. Congress has increasingly lost control over agencies in recent decades.  See, e.g., INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983) (striking down a legislative veto on immigration decisions). 
 255. See Derek Willis and Paul Kane, How Congress Stopped Working, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 5, 
2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-congress-stopped-working. 
 256. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, supra note 252, at 2246. 
 257. See, e.g., Victor Davis Hanson, Civilization Requires Collective Common Sense, NAT’L 
REV. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/09/coronavirus-policing-wildfires-
effective-response-requires-collective-common-sense/#slide-1 (arguing that common sense was 
superior to agency expertise in combating the coronavirus pandemic). 
 258. See, e.g., PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(describing executive agencies as “perfectly constitutional” but independent agencies as a “greater 
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whether the agencies are drawing on any real knowledge to inform their 
actions.259 
The critics who distrust expertise for fear of bias ultimately create a 
more open, pernicious bias.  It is not hard to see why: If the experts do not 
direct policy at the agencies, the only thing left to fill the vacuum of power 
is brute politics.  This dynamic explains why the heads of virtually every 
major rulemaking agency under President Trump were former elected 
officials or lobbyists.260  Experts can certainly be biased, but they are less 
biased than elected officials.  If that policy concern is not sufficiently 
persuasive, perhaps respect for the will of Congress would suffice.  After all, 
expertise is the model Congress endorsed for the agencies in the first place.261  
One can examine the legislative history for any of the administrative agencies 
and find no end to justifications based on the need for expertise.262  It is much 
tougher sledding to find members of Congress advocating that agencies 
should reflect the will of the executive rather than expertise in their particular 
field. 
3. Contra Justice Thomas, the Downside Risk is Limited 
The potential for increased litigation in arbitrary and capricious review 
does not immediately imply that courts should apply pretext doctrine.  What 
if, as Justice Thomas alleged in his opinion, litigants swamp courts with 
pretext-based challenges to virtually all agency actions?  Pretext is certainly 
something litigants can claim against virtually any agency action.  But 
consider that arbitrary and capricious review is also something litigants can 
use against virtually any agency action.263  The increased burden on judicial 
 
 259. Id. (describing executive agencies as “accountable to the President” and observing that 
“[t]he President in turn is accountable to the people of the United States for the exercise of executive 
power in the executive agencies”). 
 260. Consider, for example, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue, Secretary of Energy Dan 
Brouillette, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency Andrew Wheeler, and Secretary 
of the Interior David Bernhardt.  
 261. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative 
State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1404 (2013) (“By the mid-1930s, Congress had authorized 
agency action to exercise discretion under broad and imprecise statutory directives . . . . To justify 
broad and unstructured delegations to agencies under the New Deal, supporters of the expanded 
administrative state proposed the expertise model.”) 
 262. See, e.g., Hearing on Nomination of Attorney General Scott Pruitt to be Administrator of 
the U.S. Env’t Protection Agency Before the Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 115th Cong. 1, 20 
(2017) (statement of Scott Pruitt, EPA Administrator Nominee) (“The agency must be committed 
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the business of enacting effective regulations that survive legal scrutiny.”).  
 263. There are exceptions, of course, but the universe of agency actions unreviewable under the 
APA for arbitrary and capricious review is presumably coterminous with agency actions 
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resources would come about not from the claims themselves, but from the 
presumed increase in discovery for plaintiffs alleging pretext.  As the doctrine 
currently stands, litigants must make a showing of bad faith to obtain that 
additional discovery.  That part of administrative law predates pretext 
review.264  Pretext review only changes the scenario where additional 
discovery beyond the agency record reveals that the agency used pretextual 
reasoning. In that case, the agency’s action can be remanded or overturned. 
Opponents of pretext review claim that the influx of pretext claims could 
swamp agencies and courts, but forget that most major agency actions are 
already subject to litigation.265  If there is no evidence of bad faith, the claims 
will not meaningfully increase the workload of courts or agencies.  If litigants 
claim that every minor agency action is pretextual, they presumably will not 
have evidence of bad faith, and thus would not be able to drag proceedings 
out any further than they could already under arbitrary and capricious review.  
And, of course, if litigants can produce evidence of bad faith in a wide variety 
of agency actions, our concern should not be the administrative burden of 
additional discovery, but rather how we can induce agencies to act more often 
on proper rationales. 
4. Next Steps in Refining Pretext Doctrine  
The foregoing discussion showed that pretext doctrine can fill an 
important hole in regulatory law, but it remains to be seen whether courts can 
actually fashion a workable doctrine from the outline laid out by Chief Justice 
Roberts in Department of Commerce.  To avoid the pitfalls identified by the 
dissenters in Department of Commerce, pretext doctrine must become more 
specific—either through more precise wording of the central tenets or 
through federal common law applying the doctrine to specific kinds of cases.  
Courts will have to narrow the doctrine to allow a less-than-perfect mind-
meld between agency decisionmakers and the legal rationales generated by 
their subordinates.  At the same time, if the doctrine is going to deter future 
agencies from abusing the decision-making process, it will have to be broad 
enough that agencies actually fear judicial review on grounds of pretext. 
The Roberts doctrine contains several points of vagueness, but that is 
not unusual for the first ruling in a major new doctrine.  Consider an analogy 
 
unreviewable for pretext.  If subsequent cases find pretext to be a subset of arbitrary and capricious 
review, this problem happily disappears.  If not, courts will have to decide where the boundaries lie. 
 264. See Citizens to Protect Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). 
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deregulatory actions by the Trump administration challenged in court).  
  
2021] CAN AGENCIES LIE? 1073 
 
to District of Columbia v. Heller,266 the 2008 Second Amendment case that 
first recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms.267  The case did 
not create a clear test to determine whether a particular restriction on gun 
ownership violated that individual right, but provided a foundation for other 
courts to build upon, including the Supreme Court itself in future cases.268  
Similarly, Department of Commerce should be seen not as a completed 
doctrine, but as a starting point.  
E. What an “Insignificant“ Role for the Stated Rationale Means 
As discussed above, an “insignificant” role for the legal rationale is 
vague on its face.  However, it is not difficult to see how courts could make 
the rule more specific through archetypal cases.  Building a common law 
around the definition of “insignificant” will likely be easier than coming up 
with a precise a priori definition.  For example, an “insignificant” role could 
be proven by showing that the decision had already been made before the 
pretextual reason was brought to the attention of the decisionmaker.  This is, 
essentially, the Department of Commerce scenario, where the Secretary and 
his immediate subordinates were documented to be searching around for a 
legal rationale and then extracted it from the DOJ through a tortuously 
political process.269  One can imagine several other common evidentiary 
scenarios where the courts could find insignificance of the pretextual reason: 
First, the decisionmaker could state in an email that they want to adopt 
the rule regardless of whether the pretextual reason is true.  For example, the 
decisionmaker could say something like, “Find out if this rationale is true, 
and if it is not, find another one.” 
Second, the decisionmaker could state a reason for the action that is 
inconsistent with the pretextual rationale.  This did not arise in the 
Department of Commerce scenario, but one could envision an email where 
the Secretary said he wanted a citizenship question to lower apparent 
minority population totals in Democrat-leaning districts for apportionment 
 
 266. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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purposes.  That would fly in the face of the VRA enforcement rationale the 
Court found to be pretextual. 
Third, the President or presidential advisors could direct the 
decisionmaker to adopt a particular course of action.  This is perhaps the most 
controversial, but recall that it would only come into play in a situation where 
bad faith has been shown.  If the President directed the agency decision-
maker to adopt a rule for reasons totally unrelated to the eventual pretextual 
reason, that could warrant reversal or remand on pretext grounds. 
The above list is, of course, not exhaustive, but should suffice to 
illustrate how courts can approach a theoretically difficult concept like 
pretext.  The key is not to come up with a definition rigorous enough to satisfy 
a philosopher, but rather to identify certain problematic situations through 
the natural experience of common law and apply the label pretext to them. 
F. Using the “Bad Faith” Requirement to Avoid Pretext Review 
Becoming Overinclusive 
Recall the many marginal scenarios discussed earlier where a case could 
be made that an agency acted pretextually, but not in a malevolent way.270  
One such example involved an agency decisionmaker having already 
effectively made up their mind on a rule based on a substantively similar 
rationale to the one the agency came up with later, but without having seen 
the actual data and results of the agency’s study.  Few would want pretext 
review to reverse or remand that kind of rulemaking, but it is difficult to come 
up with an easily applied definition of pretext that would not include those 
benign instances. 
The “bad faith” requirement can go a long way towards weeding out the 
thorny philosophical problems that could arise in pretext review.  For 
example, one of the key questions raised above is whether one can “count” 
the legal rationale as significant if it only factored into the rulemaking for 
legal purposes—in other words, if the decisionmaker only considered the 
legal rationale because they knew they needed legal cover.  It seems obvious 
that if pretext rationale is to mean anything, merely seeking out a legal 
rationale for purposes of surviving judicial review cannot suffice.  Upon 
reflection, however, it is clear there are some situations where a rule probably 
should not be overturned on these grounds.  Earlier in this article, I discussed 
the possibility of an agency head with a relatively benign use of pretext, 
where an underlying desire to do something charitable was masked by an 
irrelevant legal rationale.271  One can also imagine a situation where the 
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agency decisionmaker had already made up their mind about what to do, but 
had the agency generate a fully fleshed out legal rationale.  For example, the 
EPA Administrator may have already made up their mind to regulate carbon 
dioxide emissions on public health grounds, and the agency’s cost-benefit 
analysis stressed the cost of alternative mitigation measures (for example, 
building seawalls).  The “bad faith” requirement protects these innocent uses 
of what might be considered “pretext,” while allowing reversal and remand 
of pernicious instances. 
III. CONCLUSION 
As with many new concepts, pretext review defies easy understanding, 
lacks precise definitions, and appears menacing to those skeptical of change.  
A strong analogy could be made to flight, the exact scientific underpinnings 
of which are still in debate to this day.272  However, just as flight has become 
a fundamental part of everyday life despite our incomplete understanding of 
it, pretext review can become a vital part of administrative law even if the 
philosophical conundrums about decision-making are not easily resolvable.  
Pretext review should be seen as a helpful evolution of arbitrary and 
capricious doctrine to address the politicization of agency expertise—a 
particular problem that, while not new, has steadily evolved into a more 
dangerous phenomenon. 
While the debate over agency politicization reached a new intensity 
under President Trump, the issue will linger on in future presidencies.  Any 
high school civics student can describe the foundation of the U.S. federal 
government and the split between legislative and executive power.  Congress 
makes the law; the President enforces the law.  Agencies, to be blunt, ruin 
this paradigm.  Congress, beset by the technical onslaught of modernity, 
delegates specific powers to agencies.  For example, Congress has neither the 
time nor the expertise to precisely set policy relating to the assignment of 
broadcast spectrum, so it passed a broad law that allows the Federal 
Communications Commission to handle the details. In this paradigm, 
agencies are drone legislatures, capable of independent action but following 
a course established by controllers in Congress.  Pretext review helps solve 
the principal-agent dilemma between Congress and agencies by making it 
harder for agencies to act based on political rationales endorsed by the 
executive branch rather than the specific criteria endorsed by Congress. 
One broad objection to the idea of pretext review is that it is utopian to 
expect agencies to be immune from politics and act only upon neutral 
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technocratic grounds.  This objection stinks of resignation and decline.  
Ultimately, the only thing that keeps an institution honest is the belief of its 
members and clients that it should be so.  If we expect agencies to act 
politically, they will eventually do so, and the very voices complaining that 
we can expect nothing more will be the first to proclaim that it was inevitable.  
While pretext review cannot cure all that ails the federal regulatory system, 
it is at least a step away from fatalistic acceptance of politicization.  If it is 
utopian to expect neutral expertise, it is at least preferable that courts nudge 
agencies toward utopia rather than dystopia. 
